Battle of Bruyères Campaign, Part I  
September 18, 1944 - October 26, 1944

13-17 September – Period of rest: cleaning, repair and inspection of equipment.

18 September – Training resumed. 672 Japanese-American replacements from the United States joined the Combat Team and were assigned to the various companies. Replacements were assigned to Combat Team per paragraph 46, SO 53 Hq 24th Replacement Depot, 17 September 1944. A ceremony of greeting for the replacements was held on 19 September.

21 September – Combat Team moved from Replacement Depot #2 Nevada Area to Staging Area #1, Bagnoli, Vic NAPLES, via truck. Distance 7 miles: weather rainy.

21-26 September – Combat Team quartered in Building (formerly University of Naples) in staging Area #1, awaiting further movement. Vehicles and equipment loaded on board ship at Texas Staging Area, Naples, on 22nd and 23rd September.

26-30 September – Entire Combat Team (less Antitank Co.) moved from staging Area #1, to Port of Naples. Personnel embarked by means of landing craft on U. S. Navy transports. USS THURSTON, DICKMAN, CHASE, HENRICO. The transports departed in convoy at 1200 27 September, sailed NW through the Tyrrenhenian Sea. Passed through the Straits of Bonifico between Sardinia and Corsica and arrived at the port of MARSEILLES, FRANCE at 1200, 29 September. Distance of voyage – 452 miles; weather – blowing sea – heavy. Personnel debarked by means of rope ladders and landing craft and assembled in Marseilles. Entrained approximately 0100 30 September and traveled 10 miles to Staging Area near SEPTEMES, closing in at 0600 30 September. Morale – excellent.

1 October – Original Unit, no change

2 October – Organization, effective upon arrival at VI Corps area (11 Oct 44. The 442nd RCT was attached to VI Corps for operations, administration remaining with Seventh Army.

4 October – The 442nd Combat Team was further attached to the 36th Infantry Division for operation.

1-8 October – 442nd Infantry (less Anti-tank Co) in bivouac near SEPTEMES, FRANCE, during a week of cold and rainy weather. Daily training was held and new machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers zeroed. Half-day passes to Marseilles and Aix-en-Provence authorized for 15% quota of personnel

9-13 October – 442nd Infantry (less Anti-Tank) began movement by motor convoy to assembly area near POUXEUX, FRANCE. CP at SEPTEMES closed at 0830 9 Oct. The first day’s movement followed Highway 7 through Aix-en-Provence, Avignon, Valence, Regiment bivouacked near VIENNE, and on the 10th continued North through Bourg, Lions Le Saunier, Resancon, and on the second night of the trip camped near VESOUL. On the third day the regiment closed in at destination, CP opening at CHARMOIS-DEVANT-BRUYERES (near EPINAL) at 1230 11 October 44 the trip covered 450 miles and was made under adverse conditions of rainy weather and slippery roads.
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS  Excerpts from the 442nd Journals

The 3rd Battalion made the trip by rail, leaving Septemes in boxcars at 1400 on 10 October. Arrived at Vesoul 0430 13 Oct., detained at 1900 and traveled by truck to Charmois-Deveant-Bruyeres, arriving at bivouac area approximately 2400 13 Oct. Organic transportation of the battalion moved at the same time in motor convoy. Last elements of the battalion closed in at 0730 14 Oct. Effective at arrival at VI Corps area, the 442nd RCT was attached to VI Corps for operations, administration remaining with Seventh Army, as per secret letter AG 370.5C Hq Seventh Army, 4 October 44. The 442nd Combat Team was further attached to the 36th Infantry Division for Operation.

14 October – Beginning at 1400 the regiment moved up by truck from Charmois-devant-Bruyeres to an assembly area near LE VOID DE LA BORDE, detrucked and marched two miles to jump-off position in the line approximately four kilometers West of BRUYERES. One casualty was sustained in the approach march, S./Sgt. William Kato of the B Company, 100th Bn was WIA.

The 442nd Infantry had direct artillery support from the 522nd Field Artillery Battalion of the 442nd RCT. The 232nd Engineer (C) Company, of the 442nd RCT, provided first priority mine clearance and road maintenance.

Our KIA loss for 14 October, 1944

442 G  Sgt. Nakamoto, Seichi  Fresno, CA
100 A  Sgt. Tezuka, Theodore T  Los Angeles, CA

October 15 The terrain through which the advance was to be made is called the Foret de Faite, a mountainous and dense pine forest Northwest of Bruyeres, known to be strongly defended by gun sites, minefields and prepared Infantry positions.

The 2nd Bn crossed the LD at 0800 in a column of companies, with F Co. leading, followed by E Co. And G Co. in battalion reserve. One machine gun platoon from H Co supported the leading rifle company, the rest of the heavy weapons provided general battalion support. F Co. met resistance three kilometers from Bruyeres, engaged in a firefight at 0930, continuing until 1230. The 1st and 2nd Platoons, F Co. killed five Germans during the day and took 14 prisoners. The company’s losses were 1 KIA, 4 WIA. Three EM from E Co. were wounded by enemy artillery. Enemy resistance increased during the afternoon, and the battalion dug in. During the night a combat patrol from Co. G was sent to Hill 468 to contact Co., G, and 143rd Inf. On the right. A patrol also maintained contact with the 100th Bn on the left.

In the coordinated attack 100th Bn also jumped off at 0800 through the thickly wooded hills with B Co. leading. Enemy resistance developed strongly, estimated at two companies supported by automatic weapons and artillery and a tank which the battalion forced to withdraw. Baker Co. fought continuously throughout the day, took five prisoners and suffered one KIA. C Co. followed B Co across the LD, exchanged small arms fire with the Germans in the woods and jug in during the afternoon. A Co. the reserve company of the 100th was subjected to a severe artillery barrage at 1430 which caused twenty casualties, 1 KIA, 19 WIA. Co. A maintained contact with G Co., 179th Inf. On the left flank Co D supported the rifle companies although the thickly wooded area restricted the use of crew-served weapons.

During the day a total of 20 German prisoners was taken, from the 9th Co., 19th SS Police Regt., and from 223rd Grenadier Regt. Information from the POW’s indicated that the CP of the 19th
SS Police Regt. Was located at the ration dump, on hill 578. Targets were brought under artillery fire. Also the location and pattern of minefields laid along the road from Bruyères were also obtained.

Our KIA loss for 15 October, 1944

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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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<tr>
<td>100 B</td>
<td>S/Sgt. Hirahara, Tomosu</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pvt. Matsunaga, Kaname</td>
<td>Kalaheo, HI</td>
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<td>100 C</td>
<td>Sgt. Mayeda, George M</td>
<td>Kelso, WA</td>
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<td>100 C</td>
<td>T/Sgt. Miyoko, Mitsuru</td>
<td>Salt Lake City, UT</td>
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<tr>
<td>442 E</td>
<td>Pvt. Sagami, Yohei</td>
<td>Fife, WA</td>
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<td>100 C</td>
<td>Cpl. Sakai, Yoshinori</td>
<td>Sacramento, CA</td>
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<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pfc. Tengwan, Yoshio</td>
<td>Lahaina, HI</td>
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<td>442 F</td>
<td>S/Sgt. Yamada, Hidio</td>
<td>Kihei, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>Pvt. Yamamoto, Takeo</td>
<td>Aiea, HI</td>
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16 October – The 100th and 2nd Battalion of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team jumped off at 0600 against heavy resistance. The recruits earned their Combat Infantrymen Badge on the 17th. The 232nd Engineers were called upon once again to clear mines and roadblocks while Companies E and F moved toward Hill 555 in front of Hill B. But as they crossed the open ground they were pinned down by a tremendous volley from their objective. On their left the 100th fared little better. Companies A and C had cleared their sector around Hill 555 but were unable to cross the open valley known as Basse do I’Ane (Donkey Flats), to reach Hill A. Worse yet, as an evening mist began to cloak the narrow valley just before dusk, the German defenders mounted a counterattack in battalion strength. Supported by artillery, mortars, self-propelled guns and a platoon of tanks, the full force of the attack fell on the 2nd Battalion, while pinned down the 100th with a hail of fire. Had it not been for the continuous barrage of the 522nd Field Artillery and 4.2 mortars the counterattack might have succeeded. Still the GI’s in their slit trenches had to fight for an hour in the eerie half-light before the last of the German Infantry pulled back. Meanwhile the 143rd Infantry had fared somewhat better, advancing all the way to Campile-Duc South of Bruyères.

The attack was resumed 0800 and again met stiff opposition. Co. F advanced against infantry and machine gun nests to within 1000 meters of Bruyeres and occupied part of Hill 555, northwest of town. Co. E was committed at 0800 on the 2nd Bn left, attacks Hill 555 under heavy fire, and occupied it at 1100. Further advance by the battalion across the open ground in front of Bruyeres was stopped when the Germans mounted a one-hour counterattack at 1730, preceded by an artillery barrage. The counterattack came from Hill “B” and included fire from SP Guns, mortars and three tanks, and an attempted recovery by enemy infantry. However the battalion broke up the attack after an hour’s fighting, without yielding any of the hard-earned ground.

Meanwhile on the regimental left, B Co., 100th Bn. Advanced 1000 yards Northeast through the forest up to open ground at the foot of Hill 578. C Co. was on the battalion right and A Co. moved up to fill the gap caused by the advance of B and C Cos. Fighting was continuous throughout the day and enemy artillery especially active.

During the day a total 21 prisoners was taken. Information from a captured document disclosed that the town of Bruyeres was also defended by the 1st and 2nd Bn., 736th Grenadier Regt.
Battle Campaigns  Excerpts from the 442nd Journals

Prisoners taken were from the 198th SS Police Regt., 3rd Co. Engineer Bn. 1316, and Fortress
Machine Gun Battalion 49th...

The night of 16-17 Oct was spent under sporadic shelling, with a cold wind and soaking rain
adding to the discomfort of the troops.

29 Officers and 300 EM over strength were transferred to the 2nd Replacement Depot at St.
Loup, in accordance with Seventh Army directive that T/O strength only would be taken into
combat

Our KIA losses for 16 October, 1944

232 Eng S/Sgt. Fuji, Abe M  Salinas, CA
442 F  Pfc. Horinouchi, James J  Honolulu, HI
442 F  Sgt. Imai, Tomio  Honolulu, HI
442 E  Pfc. Noritada, Katayama  Waipahu, HI
442 E  Pfc. Kato, Joseph H  Warm Springs, UT
442 E  Pfc. Masumoto, George H  Selma, CA
442 F  Pvt. Miyazono  Honolulu, HI
100 B  Pfc. Noritake  Seattle, WA
442 H  Pfc. Saito, George S  Los Angeles, CA
442 F  Pfc. Yamaoka, Tsutomu  Hamakua, HI

17 October – At dawn, a battalion of German Infantry attacked the 2nd Battalion’s Companies E and F,
and the 100th to the left of Hill 555. After an hour of bitter close-in fighting, the Germans pulled
back to the forward slopes of Hills A and B, regrouped, and supported by artillery and a platoon
of tanks mounted a second attack at 0930. Unable to maneuver antitank guns through the heavy
forest, the 2nd Battalion formed six bazooka teams which finally succeeded in stalling the
German armor. The second German counterattack had hit the forward platoons off the 100th
Battalion just as they were about to jump off, and some German infantry succeeded in breaching
the American positions. For awhile German and Nisei soldiers fought individual actions at a
point blank range, and the outcome was doubtful until individual squads from the 442nd
managed to regroup and beat back the assault. Shortly, thereafter, the American battalions
resumed their offensive, exploiting the German’s temporary weakness, but as soon as the lead
elements reached the valley (Donkey Flats), they again came under heavy fire from Hills A and
B, and from the stone houses at the foot of both hills, now fortified with machine guns. Late in
the afternoon Company G was committed around the RCT’s right flank. The company
succeeded in clearing some of the buildings at the base of Hill 555, but was unable to make much
headway against Hill B. At the same time Companies B and C of the 100th Battalion ran into
heavy fire from an estimated 15 machine guns and two light anti-tank guns. Company C sent out
a patrol led by Lieutenant Masanao Otake to reconnoiter enemy strength in the houses located at
the foot of Hill A. Aided by fog, the patrol safely reached the first house and Otake decided to
move up to the next one alone. While inside, he was spotted by a Germans who sent a squad his
way. Supported by his own men’s covering fire he took a heavy toll of the attacking squad but
was killed by a burst of machine-pistol fire. For his gallantry, Lieutenant Otake was
posthumously award the Distinguished Service Cross.

On the 3rd day of the action the Germans counterattacked twice early in the day to drive our
forces from Hill 555. At 0730, following a heavy barrage by artillery and SP high-velocity guns, two companies of enemy Infantry attacked Cos E and F on Hill 555. At the same time an attack of similar size was launched against B and C Cos on the left. The rifle companies, supported by their attached heavy weapons and fire from 522nd Artillery Bn repulsed the attack at 0830. The Germans reformed on the wooded slopes of Hill A and Hill B and again attacked at 0930, supported by artillery and three tanks. The attack drove against the 2nd Battalion because of the impossibility of getting the 57mm Antitank guns into the forest, the battalion formed six bazooka teams to meet the armor, and with all available fire power drove the Germans back into the hills from which the attack had come.

Immediately both the 2nd and 100th Bns resumed the offensive subject again to artillery and mortar and automatic weapons fire from the German held Hills A and B. In addition the Germans had fortified the houses at the foot of these Hills, arming them with machine guns which commanded the flat land between Hill 555 and Hills A and B. Both battalions found themselves pinned down by this fire and faced with the necessity of reducing these houses before resuming the advance. The Germans were well dug in, and their positions resisted artillery fire

Baker and Charley Companies, aided by 4.2 mortars, worked on the houses along the 100th Bn. Front, finding them opposed by 15 machine guns and two AT guns. G Co. went around to the regimental right flank, and aided by four tanks, cleared out the houses on the road running SE-NW along the foot of Hill 555. Cos E and F advanced to the tip of the woods. The intense automatic and small arms fire coming across the open terrain forced them to remain in this position for the remainder of the day. Prisoners taken during the day – 3.

During the night, a 15-man patrol from 2nd Platoon, Co. G. guided by an FFI partisan, reached the road junction at the edge of Bruyeres at 0200 meeting no opposition and returned at 0250. Additional reconnaissance patrols were immediately sent out, one from B Co., towards Hill 578 which drew fire and withdrew, and a daylight patrol from 2nd Platoon, Co. G, which penetrated the fringe of Bruyeres and returned at 0700 18 Oct without encountering the enemy.

Our KIA losses for 17 October, 1944

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<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
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<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pvt. Ajitomo, Tokio</td>
<td>Pvt.</td>
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<td>Lahaina, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>442 G</td>
<td>Pfc. Chibana, Henry M</td>
<td>Pfc.</td>
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<td>Koloa, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>442 F</td>
<td>Pfc. Ikehara, Kikuichiro</td>
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<td>Wahiawa, HI</td>
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<td>442 2Hq</td>
<td>Pvt. Kanaya, Walter E</td>
<td>Pvt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>442 G</td>
<td>Cpl. Kokubu, Jimmie</td>
<td>Cpl.</td>
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<td>Portland, OR</td>
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<td>442 E</td>
<td>Pfc. Komoto, Nobuo</td>
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<td>2nd Lt, Otake, Masanao</td>
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<td>Pfc. Shigeta, Hideo</td>
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<td>Pfc. Tanji, Mitsuo</td>
<td>Pfc.</td>
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18 October   – The fall of Bruyeres. In the early twilight, the 3rd Battalion moved up to the right of the 2nd Battalion for the push into town. Companies I and L reached the line of departure over open ground without being observed by German machine gunners. The attack was prepped by a 30-minute artillery barrage on Hills A and B as well as Bruyeres itself. Five battalions of artillery – sixty guns fired at maximum capacity. The attack commenced with eight companies abreast – the men of the 3rd Battalion making a wild dash across the narrow, open valley toward town,
blanketed by a heavy smoke screen. By 1100, Company B had reduced the machine gun nests inside the houses at the foot of Hill A and was heading into the forest. After covering Company B’s left flank, Company A followed up the hill, mopping up stragglers while Company C attacked on the battalion’s right. After four hours of bitter fighting on Hill A, it was finally taken and all three rifle companies dug in for the expected counterattack. Companies F and G weren’t as fortunate. At noon they were still fighting in the open area between their line of departure and Hill B, pinned down by murderous machine gun fire. The key machine gun in the German defense line was finally knocked out by 60mm mortars affording both companies a toe-hold at the foot of Hill B. To their right elements of Company I had managed to get around the hill and now was fighting their way up the southern slopes. Faced with this threat on their left flank the Germans were forced to shift some of their men from 2nd Battalion’s frontal assault and after a six-and-a-half hour fight, yielded the mountain. With the Hill B taken, company L entered Bruyeres from the north, clearing Rue Joffre house by house. When a Company L patrol made contact with Company C of the 143rd Regiment approaching from the south, it was clear that the town had fallen. Time was 1830, and the firing ebbed. Only on Stanisias Square did a group of Germans hold out until midnight. The 4,000 French civilians were finally able to come out of their basements, overjoyed and surprised at the sight of the small Asian men in American uniforms. They offered wine and the little food they had left to their liberators and in some instances invited them into their homes. But there was little time for rest. 134 prisoners were taken during the day’s fighting and German killed and wounded equaled that number. Some of the new prisoners were part of the 198th Fusilier Battalion and the 192nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment detached from the 21st Panzer Division to the north. There were also men from various battle groups hastily formed from other units to stem the American advance. According to Warmer Kortenhaus, former editor of the 21st Panzer Division’s magazine “Weg,” several “Kamofgruppen” had been dispatched to the Bruyeres sector to support the German 716th and 16th Infantry Divisions. German military archives verify this.

“At the beginning of the month (October) the center of fighting for 21st Panzer Division shifted from the right wing to the left wing where its neighbor, the 16th Infantry Division, in the region of Rambervillers and farther south was under heavy pressure by the slowly advancing Americans (36th Division) in the difficult, forested region. The strong pressure of the 3rd, 36th, and 45th US Infantry divisions against the weak positions, of its left neighbor (German 16th Division) in the direction of St. Die, forced the Army to continuously seek new remedies. “The loss of Rambervillers on September 30, forced the Army Corps to attach 10 companies from the 21st Panzer Division to its left neighbor (16th Division) in the Mortagne Sector. “Staff of the Panzer Regiment 22 and1/22 equipped with 12 Panzer IV. 1 Panzer Grenadier Regiment 192 reinforced by 7/192 and 6/125 equipped with 2-Panzer Werfer (rocket launchers) and 1-multiple launcher (screaming meemies). “These companies, were often no stronger than 50 to 60 men, were continuously in heavy combat and during ever cooler, rainy weather. The nights were very cold, and the soldiers hadn’t had a roof over their heads for weeks on end, and no opportunity for the most basic personal hygiene. Nevertheless, the division had surprisingly few losses due to illness. “Under these circumstances the formation of reserves was nearly impossible. Emergencies forced commanders to improvise, taking most of their reserves from the older men of the support services which were organized into „Alarm Companies,” and brought into action. “Even though designated a Panzer Division, the 21st had few heavy weapons in October 1944. Depending on deliveries of new equipment and spare parts, the numbers fluctuated: 8-19 Self propelled assault guns, 12-10 Panzer IV, 914 Panzer V, 55-77 Anti-tank guns (among them 6-8 88mms),”

All-out attack on Hills A and B, for occupation of Bruyeres. Following a half-hour artillery
preparation, Cos F and G assaulted Hill B, with Cos I 3rd and L of the Battalion committed on
their right. At the same time, the 100th Battalion attacked Hill A. All units met bitter opposition.

At 1100, Baker Co. Had reduced resistance in the houses at the foot of Hill A and was fighting up
the slope. Co. A went around to the left, where its 3rd Platoon silences a machine gun nest in a
house, taking nine prisoners, then dashed across the open flat and followed B Co. up the hill. Hill
A was taken at 1420, and the battalion dug into defensive position to guard against possible
counterattack. B Co. took 45 prisoners during the day, lost 1 KIA, 14 WIA. C Co., in a day-long
firefight on the hill, captured 21 prisoners, casualties 2 KIA, 9 WIA. The attack on Hill B began
at 1000 and was successful after eight and a half hours of bitter fighting. F Co., jumped off,
found its advance held up by a machine gun at the foot of the hill, destroyed it by accurate fire
from a 60mm mortar crew. At 1200 the company was engaged in a firefight in the open area
between Hill 555 and Hill B. Co G on the right of the battalion sector also forced its way up the
steep side of the hill. During the fight the 2nd Bn radio RP was hit by enemy artillery and
communications temporarily interrupted. I Co. was next to G on its right and L Co. went around
the base of the hill, north of the road net into Bruyeres, where there were street fighting to clear
house by house. Contact was made with C Co. of 143rd Infantry, who entered the town from the
South at 1830.

By nightfall the town was under control, although a barricaded group of Germans continued to
resist in the center of the town. L Co. sent a patrol to the eastern outskirts at the foot of Hill D,
where they were informed by the French inhabitants that 15 Germans were in a house to their
rear. At the same time machine pistols opened up and the patrol had to fight it way back to the
company. K Co. the reserve Co. of the 3rd Bn. entered Bruyeres at 1700, after having disposed
of snipers on the way.

During the day the 2nd and 3rd Battalions took 61 prisoners, bringing the day’s total for the
regiment to 134. Enemy losses in killed and wounded were proportionately heavy.

The regimental forward CP moved up during the day, from Le Void de la Borde to a position
along the trail on Hill 555. Weather was cold and the rain continued to fall for the 16th
consecutive day. Supply and evacuation presented a difficult problem, as road blocks had to be
cleared by engineers and the vehicles and truck drawn weapons found themselves mired in mud
over their wheels.

The 141st Field Artillery Bn. And the 93rd Armored Field Artillery Bn. Were attached during the
day to the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, to reinforce the fire of the 522nd Field Artillery
Battalion.

Additional identifications of enemy units encountered: 1st, 2nd 7th Cos. 736th Grenadier Regt;
1st Co. 716 Engineer Bn. Company Rode, Battle Group Ahrens, 2nd, 3rd Cos, 198th Fusilier Bn:
2nd Co., 192nd Panzer Grenadier Regt.

Our KIA losses for 18 October, 1944

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<th>Company</th>
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<th>City</th>
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<td>442 E</td>
<td>Pvt. Fukumura, Ichiji</td>
<td>Lihue, HI</td>
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<td>100 B</td>
<td>Sgt. Hosoda, Max M</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
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<td>442 2Hq</td>
<td>Sgt. Kijima, Tadashi</td>
<td>Pauwela, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>442 F</td>
<td>Pfc. Morimoto, Toshiaki</td>
<td>Hakalau, HI</td>
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</table>
19 October – The enemy attacked with a very heavy artillery and mortar barrage, including white phosphorous, in the 16th Infantry Division sector, inflicting heavy casualties.

The next three days, October 20-23, during the clearing and then pleasant fall weather, brought heavy battles east of Bruyeres against the 16th Infantry Division, including the losses of the towns of Brouvelieures, Vervezella, Domfaina and Belmont.”

The Americans now stood at the Mortagne sector, entrance to the 14km long wooded pass road to St. Die.” The mountainous forest had an almost jungle-like character which swallowed men. The individual fighting units usually had large sectors to defend, and contact was easily lost. Also navigating through these woods was very difficult. Communications between the various fighting units and command posts was problematic. Many of the incorrect or delayed messages can be explained by the difficulty messengers encountered in the deep ravines of the wooded thickets. By the time a messenger reached the command post the situation at the front usually had already changed.” „The wooded heights of the Vosges Mountains gradually diminish toward the west. Two good pass-roads lead west to east from Bruyeres to Brouvelieures-les-Rouges-Eaux to St. Die and the other from Rambervillers over Bru- St. Benoit to Raon L. Elapse. Also roads leading through the hilly wooded countryside had steep drops on each side, and were bordered on the other side by steep, wooded slopes. Traffic was only possible on the roads and main attacks threatened along these roads. The enemy controlled the streets through constant artillery harassing fire which was directed by forward air controllers during the day. Therefore our re-supply convoys could only move by night.” „The forests were pine and leafy trees with many thickets and fallen logs. Visibility was often no more than 90 meters.”

The enemy seemed to appear everywhere. Because of this and the tree bursts of the enemy artillery our soldiers did not like to fight in the forests. Many of our fighting groups frequently had to set up defensive perimeters because a continuous front was impossible. Also digging in was difficult because of the many roots and because fortifications were only temporary.”

Meanwhile the 100th Battalion followed Task Force O’Connor’s route and then continued northeast along the ridge line overlooking the small town of Biffontaine. To seize the high ground would have effectively cut the Belmont-Biffontaine road, forcing the German units in Belmont to surrender or retreat north into the arms of the 7th Infantry Regiment (on the 442nd RCT’s left flank). The 100th was advancing in columns of companies with Company B providing rear security. Twice this company engaged in skirmishes with strong German combat patrols, but there were no longer any organized resistances against the battalion’s forward thrust. While the 100th pushed east, the 3rd Battalion continued to the northeast and the 2nd Battalion reverted to regimental reserve for the night.

The next objective for the 442nd RCT was Hill D (Avison), east of town. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked it at 1000 hours, while the 100th remained in reserve on Hill A. By noon Hill D was taken, and the lead companies pressed toward the railroad embankment east of Bruyeres on the edge of Bois de Boremount. By 1800 the companies dug in west of the embankment, about 100 yards from a well fortified German force. Companies I and K however found themselves in the middle of a mine field with no choice but to remain there for the night. Co I ran into several trip wire mines and Capt. Byrnes almost tripped a land-mine tripping device and
Taba yelled out in earnest and saved the day. Thus, by nightfall, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 442nd had established a 2,000 yard salient into enemy-held territory while Hill C (Poinhaie) to the regiment’s left rear remained in German hands. Realizing this threat the Division Commander, General Dahlquist, ordered the 100th Battalion to seize Hill C the following day. Meanwhile German artillery shells continued to pound Bruyeres and the seriously wounded and elderly had to be evacuated to towns farther west.

While L Co. completed the mopping up of Bruyeres on the morning of the 19th, the 2nd and the remaining elements of the 3rd Bn. Pushed onward from the town and assaulted Hill D. The battalion jumped off at 1000 with the 2nd Bn on the left and the 3rd Bn on the right. Once again our forces were subjected to heavy artillery fire but the enemy Infantry was dislodged and the Hill was secured by 1145. The battalions reorganized and attacked again at 1300 with the objective of reaching the railroad embankment 2000 yards east of Bruyeres on the edge of the Forêt de Belmont. Cos E and G from the 2nd Bn and Cos I and K from the 3rd Bn made the push. Enemy troops dug in behind the embankment held up the advance at 1600, and SP guns from the vicinity of Belmont shelled the forward companies. An artillery mission was called on the SP’s and the four rifle companies fought up to their objective at 1800. 16 prisoners were taken.

During the day, the 100th Bn was in regimental reserve on Hill A, and at 1700 moved into Bruyeres, leaving A Co. on the hill to guard the roads leading down from north. A reconnaissance patrol was sent to Hill C to ascertain enemy strength. It drew small arms and machine gun fire and retired.

The regimental CP moved into Bruyeres at 1500. The Germans shelled the town continuously during the day and night. As a result of the bombardment by both our own and enemy artillery, and the house-to-house fighting, practically every building had suffered some demolition. However the 232nd Engineer C Co. swept the road net and the military value of the town was unimpaired. Because of the shelling, combat traffic regulations were put into effect—no 2-1/2 ton trucks except signal vehicles allowed during daylight hours, with a maximum of one vehicle passing every two minutes.

**Our KIA losses for 19 October, 1944**

| 442 E | Pfc. Horiuchi, Paul F | Salinas, CA |
| 442 G | Pvt. Kanetomi, Jiro | Kirkland, WA |
| 442 E | Pfc. Kondo, Henry | Pasadena, CA |
| 100 A | Pfc. Nishimura, Wilfred | Honolulu, HI |

**20 October** – Colonel Singles launched the 100th Battalion attack with three companies abreast. The men fought their way up Hill C by noon but the speed of the advance left a number of enemy pockets in the battalion’s rear and three more hours of sharp fighting before resistance ceased. But later that day, General Dahlquist ordered the hill cleared, an order that proved to be costly when the hill had to be retaken by the 7th Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division. That same morning the 442nd found itself in the unenviable position of being caught between several German units. One, a force of about 100 men had infiltrated Hill D during the night and was causing considerable problems in the 2nd and 3rd Battalions’ rear. In particular, they harassed the engineers who had begun to clear the Belmont road. The 2nd Battalion’s reserve Company F
augmented by one platoon from Companies H and L, was ordered to attack the German infiltrators at the very same time when the 2nd and 3rd Battalion front was being shelled and counterattacked by German armor and infantry. Two of the tanks followed by infantry hit Company G where Staff Sergeant Yoshimi Fujiwara’s squad was already engaged in a firefight. When he saw the attackers come toward him, Fujiwara climbed a small knoll and fired antitank grenades. Finding that they were ineffective, he got a bazooka, and fired again, scoring a partial hit on the lead tank. Still the tank advanced raking Fujiwara’s position with machine gun fire.

The sergeant’s fifth rocket finally stopped the tank in its tracks, prompting the second tank and infantry to withdraw. Staff Sergeant Fujiwara was credited with preventing a breakthrough in Company G’s sector and received the Distinguished Service Cross. As the battle raged in front, progress was very slow for Company F trying to dislodge the German infiltrators on Hill D. The fight was still at a deadlock when Technical Sergeant Abraham Ohama went to the aid of a wounded 2nd platoon soldier. Disregarding Ohama’s white flag the Germans continued their fire, wounding the sergeant. When a team of litter bearers with distinctive Red Cross markings, attempted to evacuate, both men and all four were wounded in a hail of fire and Ohama was killed. At that moment without a word or command every man in Company F got on his feet and charged the German positions. They fought furiously, mercilessly, killing more than fifty of the grenadiers. Only seven enemy survived by hiding themselves and surrendering the following morning. Like the others Michio Takata would always remember the attack and its aftermath. We devastated the Germans. By that time, they were using boys, 16 or 17 years old. The Germans had run out of manpower. It was a pity to see young Germans yelling, getting shot and asking for mercy. It was pitiful. I remember our Company Commander Captain Hill, trying to apply first aid to a 16-year old boy whose testicles were blown away a 16 year old kid. I remember Captain Hill, with tears in his eyes, trying to help the boy.

In the afternoon, observers spotted a German armored column moving down the road from Belmont toward the regiment’s left flank. Colonel Pence, fully aware of the serious threat to his left flank, dispatched Task Force Felber to meet the force on the Bruyeres-Belmont road. But before the two units could engage each other, a flight of Thunderbolts bombed and strafed the German column, reporting seven hits. It must be noted that by fall of 1944 the Allies had achieved undisputed air superiority with 4,700 fighters, 6,000 medium and heavy bombers, and 4,000 reconnaissance and transport planes. This advantage was, however, hampered by prolonged bad weather. At 1710 after a twenty-minute artillery barrage, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked again to the south. They managed to cross the railroad embankment, but fields of S-mines and dug-in German infantry ground the attack to a halt short of the Bois de Belmont. In the fighting, a BAR man from Company K killed a German Oberieutnant, adjutant to the commander of the sector, who was carrying plans for its defense. These valuable documents were taken to division G-2 and based on the information General Dahlquist and Colonel Pence developed a plan to circumvent the German defenses. Major Emmet O’Connor executive officer of the 3rd Battalion was put in charge of a hastily assembled task force comprised of Companies F and L supported by and with radio and telephone wire crews, and a mine sweeping squad. Then, during the dark of night the unit moved alongside the railroad tracks from Bruyeres to a point south of Hill 505 held by the Germans.

The day began with the 2nd and 3rd Bns dug in 75 yards from the railroad embankment, answering heavy sniper fire from the flanks and from Hill D. This small arms fire also interdicted the road leading around Hill D towards Belmont and the road junction where the engineers were attempting to mine-sweep in preparation for a tank advance.
During the night, German snipers had also attacked a supply party from Hq Co. 2nd Bn. Carrying rations to the front and in the action Lt. Charles O. Farnum, 0-297242 Commanding Officer of Hq Co. 2nd Bn. Was killed. It was evident that some Germans had infiltrated under cover of darkness back to Hill D, and Co. F, the reserve Company of the 2nd Bn, with an additional platoon from Co. H armed with carbines, was ordered to neutralize this fire.

At 1000 the 100th Battalion assaulted Hill C to the North with all three rifle companies in the attack.

At 1030 German Infantry counterattacked the 2nd and 3rd Bns front along the railroad track. With the firefight on Hill D, the 100’s assault on Hill C, and the German counterattack increasing in intensity on the front, all our forces were committed simultaneously in heavy fighting.

The 2nd and 3rd Bns with Cos E, G, I and K on the line, met the counterattack and repulsed it at 1100. However forward movement was prevented by the German MLR along the railroad track and at the edge of the woods beyond, and fire from Hill 505. The Germans had machine guns on the flanks and mortars emplaced in the woods which covered thick mine fields in front of them and raked the zone of advance. The Prisoner reported that the forces confronting the two battalions were elements of the previously identified 726 Grenadier regiment. The 100th Bn. After a battalion firefight, reported Hill C taken at 1200. However it required several more hours of sharp fighting to completely clean the hill of the numerous enemy pocket. After the hill was secured the 100th moved over to Hill D, leaving B Co. on Hill C to make contact with the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry (3rd Division), who garrisoned the hill after the 100th’s withdraw.

In the fighting on Hill D a soldier from the 2nd Platoon, Co. F was wounded and his platoon sergeant, T Sgt Abraham Ohama sent to his rescue. T/Sgt Ohama was in turn hit, and as he was being carried down the hill by litter bearers the Germans opened up again, killing him on the stretcher. Incited by this act, the company charged headlong up the hill, engaging the Germans in hand to hand, tree-to-tree fighting. Fifty Germans were killed and seven captured. As a result of the two days fighting, over 100 German bodies were counted on the hill.

At 1300 the 2nd Battalion reported German tanks and infantry moving south out of Belmont 2 kilometers distant, with the evident intention of striking our left flank. The Regimental Commander ordered Felber Force out to meet them. At the same time an air mission was called on this new threat.

Felber Force moved out slowly, held up by mines and SP fire from Vervezelle. A TOT barrage was put on the latter target and the tanks moved as far as the hairpin turn where they were held up.

The enemy armor moving down the road toward them was bombed and strafed by fighter-bombers and brought under artillery fire. The air support had no opposition and reported seven direct hits on the enemy column.

From 1645 to 1705 four battalions of artillery laid down a preparatory fire on the German positions in front, and at 1710 the 2nd and 3rd Bns. Attacked again. Both battalions crossed the railroad track but the dug-in Germans and fields of antipersonnel S mines halted further progress. In the fighting K Co. Killed a German Major and his party and secured his documents which contained plans for the defense of the sector, and additional identification. They were sent to G2
During the day Bruyeres was heavily shelled by enemy artillery. A total of 97 Prisoners were captured.

During the afternoon and evening of the 20th, when the second attack of our battalions failed to make headway, and with Felber Force contained along the road on the left flank, the Divisional Commander and the Regimental Commander planned a surprise move to outflank the enemy MLR.

The plan took shape with Co. F and Co. K organized as a special Task Force under the command of Major Emmett O’Conner’s, 3rd Battalion Executive Officer. A squad of wiremen and minesweepers from Hq Co. 3rd Bn. Was attached and Lt. Nilges of the regimental staff acted as S-3. The mission of the Task Force was to move South behind our lines during the night to a point opposite the ridge of the Bois De Borement, to move along the tip of the ridge at dawn to an assembly area, and strike North at the enemy left flank at 0900. At the same hour, the 2nd and 3rd Bns were to renew their attack from the front, and the 100th Bn swinging south and following the path of the Task Force, was to push further along the ridge toward the town of Biffontaine. The attack of the Third Division and the presence of Felber Force on the road to Belmont secured the left Flank.

The plan was executed with precision and achieved a notable success.

**Our KIA losses for 20 October, 1944**

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<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>442</td>
<td>Lt.</td>
<td>Farnum, Charles</td>
<td>Orangeburg, SC</td>
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<td>100 C</td>
<td>2nd Lt</td>
<td>Fujitani, Ross K</td>
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<td>Pfc.</td>
<td>Hadano, Hatsuji</td>
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<td>Hattori, Kunio</td>
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<td>S/Sgt.</td>
<td>Inakazu, Ben M</td>
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<td>Kameoka, Bob T</td>
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<td>Ohama, Abraham L</td>
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<tr>
<td>442 G</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>White Jr., Floyd E</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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**21 October** - At dawn, the task force proceeded to the top of the ridge behind the German left flank while the 2nd and 3rd Battalions prepared for a frontal assault. In a coordinated attack the two battalions launched their assault just as Task Force O’Connor reached the open ground behind the German lines. Colonel Pence ordered the task force to assault the German rear, catching the defenders off guard. Lieutenant Albert Binotti was a forward observer with the task force when
he brought heavy and accurate fire to bear on the German unit concealed in the woods, killing 80 and bringing about the capture of 54 others.

The frontal attack on the other side of the hill met with stiff resistance, but when the defenders realized they were also being attacked from the rear, the Germans withdrew. By 1030, resistance waned and by noon Companies I and K had taken Hill 505. But there was no time to rest. To exploit their success, the 2nd Battalion tried to catch up with Task Force O’Connor, engaging German armor with carefully directed artillery from the 522nd FA. The advancing battalions finally linked up with the task force by mid-afternoon at a hamlet called La Broquaine. By then, the task force had already broken the last resistance, dislodging a tank from cover, and driving the scattered infantry up the valley toward Belmont. In additions, 3-ammunition carriers, 1-antitank gun and large quantity of small arms were captured, and Task Force O’Connor was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation.

The German Army log for that time period assessed the situation very devastating.

The Task Force crossed the IP at 0500 and reached its forward assembly area at 0740, completing its long “end run” without opposition. At 0900 all elements attacked. The Task Force moved down off the ridge through the woods and into the enemy flank, one company assaulting and one in support. At 0925 they reported reaching the open ground at the foot of the ridge and cleaning out resistance in houses. At 0945 Colonel Pence ordered them to turn left and strike the enemy rear.

Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Bns. Jumped off abreast, with the 2nd on the left and the 3rd on the right. They crossed the railroad track and moved into the forward slope of Hill 505. The enemy engaged them in a firefight, but, attacked from both front and rear, gave ground rapidly. At 1030 the 3rd Bn reported I and K Cos. Going around Hill 505 against lessening resistance, 1200 the battalion had over-run the positions on Hill 505 and was pressing forward to make contact with the Task Force. The 2nd Bn was temporarily held up by tanks at 1130, but called artillery on them and resumed the advance on the regiment’s left.

The Task Force engaged the retreating Germans in a stiff fight in a group of houses. They fought from house to house, killing and capturing many of the enemy foot troops, and dislodged a tank with bazooka fire.

At 1430 K Co. made contact with the Task Force and the 2nd Bn half an hour later, after which Cos F and L reverted to the control of their respective battalions.

During the operation the Task Force killed 80 Germans, captured 54 prisoners, 1 Antitank gun, 3 ammunition carriers and a large quantity of rifles and machine pistols, in addition to being the key factor in a regimental advance of four kilometers during the day against positioned which had previously resisted assault. The cost of the operation was three men wounded in action. O’Connor’s Task Force awarded the PUC.

Concurrent with the above action, the 100th Battalion was working along the tip of the ridge running through the Bois De Boremont and the Foret de Belmont, following the trail used by the Task Force. They passed the point where the Task Force turned North at 1400 and continued toward their objective, the high ground around Biffontaine. B Co. protecting the rear of the battalion was twice engaged by German combat patrols as the battalion pushed deep into enemy
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS  Excerpts from the 442nd Journals

territory. The 100th reach its objective at 1530 and occupied a strategic position cutting off Belmont from Biffontaine and completing a loop around the Germans in the sector. In order to reach its position, the battalion had to accept difficulties in communications and supply, as they were a mile from the nearest friendly troops and the forest trail over which they had come was patrolled by enemy combat groups. The battalion had tied into the wire laid by the Task Force and extended it, but had reason to believe that the Germans had tapped the line. During the day a total of 72 prisoners were captured, interrogated and turned over to Division. Lieutenant General TRUSCOTT, Commanding General VI Corps, visited the regimental CP in Bruyeres during the mid-afternoon. The town was again shelled by German Artillery.

Our KIA losses for 21 October, 1944

100 C  Pfc. Hasegawa, Kiyoshi  Papaikou, HI
100 B  Pfc. Komatsu, James K  Honolulu, HI
442 E  Pvt. Shoji, Toshiaki  Livingston, CA

22 October - The 3rd Battalion moved out with three rifle companies abreast. Their mission was to clear pockets of German resistance between Belmont and the 100th Battalion. The terrain was extremely rough and the troops came under constant artillery fire as they advanced. Meanwhile the 100th Battalion had established itself in a semi-circular fashion on the heights overlooking Biffontaine. Realizing their predicament, the Germans launched a counter-attack supported by artillery, screaming-meemies and 88 flaks. Firefights were soon raging on three sides of the battalion, but the Germans were not strong enough to sustain their momentum in the protracted fight, the 100th nearly exhausted its supplies of ammunition and water and medical evacuation facilities soon proved to be inadequate for the many casualties sustained.

To relieve the shortages, a supply column from Task Force Felber left Belmont with ammunitions and water. Consisting of five light tanks with one infantry platoon from Company A, attempted to break through on the Belmont-Biffontaine road. But as soon as they got into the hills, the column was ambushed by a German company. The infantry riding on top of the tanks were virtually defenseless as the German guns raked them, killing three and wounding several more. Staff Sergeant Itsumu Sasaoka manning the machine gun on the rear Tank, returned a steady stream of fire against the ambush positions. Even through he was badly injured by the initial burst he continued to provide covering fire for the withdrawal until he fell from the lurching tank, he was listed missing in action and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Still the infantry and some of the tank crews tried to make their way on foot, but were unable to find their way to the 100th Battalion through the densely wooded hills.

The next day, the same German company would attack the 232nd and 111th engineers engaged in road-clearing operations. But after being bracketed by several rounds of 81mm mortar fire (from 3rd Bn.), the group decided to surrender to the engineer’s surprise.

At the same time, another fight was raging in the Col de Anelle region (Hill 703). Companies E and F of the 2nd Battalion were engaged with approximately 100 German bicycle troops who had been sent down the Biffontaine valley during the night. Their mission to cut off the 100th failed, however, as the American companies beat off the attack in a fierce fight at close quarters, they managed to take six prisoners. Meanwhile at the 100th Battalion, ammunition and water were running critically short. Lieutenant Milton Brenner along with one platoon from Company L set
out through the woods to obtain the much needed supplies from the rear. The party succeeded in making their way through the difficult terrain and managed to return with carrying ammunitions and supplies. Even though German line of resistance and supply lines were almost non-existent General Dahlquist decided that Biffontaine had to be taken.

A worthless tactical objective, “according to Captain Young O. Kim, the Korean American who served with the 100th Battalion. We took heavy casualties because in one day of fighting, we were extremely low on ammunition, and in three days of fighting we were without food and desperately needed medical supplies.”

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Our KIA losses for 22 October, 1944

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<td>442 F</td>
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<td>100 D</td>
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<td>Tsukano, Ichiro</td>
<td>Pepeekeo, HI</td>
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</table>
October 23 - At 1,000 hours, Company C descended on Biffontaine supported by fire from Company A. The speed of the attack caught the Germans off guard. Several houses were taken, but when Company B entered the village from the opposite flank, the Germans struck back. After three hours of house-to-house and room-to-room fighting, Company C captured most of the village and Company D trapped a retreating group of Germans with its machine gun fire. Twenty-three prisoners were taken, including a signal corps major who later proved to be a valuable source to Division Intelligence. Also numerous small arms and ammunition were captured and distributed among the rifle companies.

But at the edge of the forest, Nisei soldiers lay wounded and dying in Josephine Vonn’s cottage. The good woman assisted as best she could, and kept her blood-stained mattresses still years after the war.

Captain Israel Yost recalls, “I was furious when I saw the life draining out of the young men in Biffontaine, and seeing them pushed toward annihilation in the forest.”

To evacuate some of the wounded to the rear, the 100th prepared a litter train made up of medics from the 100th and 3rd Battalion plus some prisoners of war. The group led by Lieutenant James Kanabe managed to go only a short distance when they were surrounded by a German Patrol. One of the wounded, Captain Young O. Kim, winner of the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star, managed to roll off his litter and escape into the woods in spite of painful arm and head wounds. Technician Fourth Grade Richard Chinen, a medic made a break with him while the remaining 20 men was captured.

Sueo Fujii, one of the medics was sent to Stalag 5A where he cared for American prisoners he said, “in Stuttoart I was interrogated by a Eurasian woman who said she was German-Japanese. She knew all about the 442nd and even knew which island I came from and our training problems at Camp Shelby.” Fujii was later transferred to Stalag 7A near Munich were he was liberated on April 29, 1945 outside the camp.

But in Biffontaine, the front was far from over. German forces counterattacked again. Tanks came to within 50 yards of Company C inside the stone houses. Shelling was at point blank range. Fortunately the Americans had taken to the cellars and emerged just in time to throw back the infantry assault that followed. In one of the houses the captured German signal corps major was advising the American to surrender –advice that was not well received. Finally in one desperate infantry charge at dawn, broke against the 100th’s first line of defense.

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**Our KIA losses for 23 October, 1944**

- 100 D  Pfc. Furuyumo, Edward S Aiea, HI
- 100 C  Pfc. Honda, Richard M Honolulu, HI
- 100 A  Pfc. Sugiyama, Itsuo Kukuhaele, HI
- 100 A  Sgt. Suyama, George W Harvey, MT

**October 24:** The 100th and 3rd Bns maintained defensive positions until relieved by the 141st and 143rd Infantry respectively. The 3rd Bn closed into the assembly area near Belmont at 1400, less one platoon of L Co., which stayed overnight in its position. The 100th Bn. closed at 1730. **Felber Force** was detached from the 442nd Infantry. Seven enemy stragglers were rounded up while the relief was being completed.

**Our KIA loss for 23 October, 1944**

- 100 A  S/Sgt. Togo, Shiro Kahuku, HI

**25 October** - Radio message between 2nd Bn and 1st Bn. “Friendly elements held up Pt N; will try and break through and get supplies to you. Friendly elements are trying to make contact at Point 9. Enemy we encounter are small groups but very aggressive.

**1640: 1st Bn to S-2:** 3PWs from 198 fus Bn; now have two cos with total of 80 men; originally three cos 65 men each supported by two light tank. Have 3 MG; been in area 8 days; captured vic 321586

**2115 Co 1st Bn to CO** Co A patrol encountered rd block at Pt 10 (338579); one man killed;
The 442nd was relieved by the 141st and 143rd Infantry Regiments and pulled back to Belmont. After ten days of continuous fighting, the men received dry clothes, hot food, baths and much needed rest. The intensity of the Battle had been far worse than anything they had experiences in Italy. There resistance usually ceased after two or here days, followed by a planned withdrawal. But in and around Bruyeres there had been no letup. The Germans fought day and night with the desperation of men with their backs against the wall. According to Rudy Tokiwa, most of the young Germans were “fanatical and not smart enough to know when they were licked.” Also the weather played a large role as it was terribly cold and rainy through out. Some GI’s preferred risking death in the open rather than spending a nights in fox holes half filled with freezing water. In the early day of the campaign, a casual observer might have sworn that the Nisei had nerves of steel. But after days of relentless fighting, the strain was beginning to show. A few soldiers had to be sent to the rear suffering from combat fatigue. This was no reflection on the courage of any man. No soldier was equipped to stand the terrible pounding, lack of sleep and sudden shocks of this unseeingly and unnerving battle. But even the best trained men were not immune to the continuous shellfire. Several men were hit while attending to their chores. But the worst was yet to come.

26 October - Radio Messages

0923 Co to CG: 1st Bn been cut off for 36hrs but in contact by arty radio; at this morning to try to contact.

0935 Co 1st Bn to CO: Last msg received from Bn at 0835 acknowledging receipt of order to try and knock out rd block.

1047 CG to Co: 1st Bn to atk to rear immediately; situation has been stalemated 36 hrs. Have four Bns under you control and are still not doing anything. Put on attack and surround the enemy. Tell 2nd Bn 442 they are on their own. Can’t you use arty on enemy? Ans: can’t use arty as shell land too close and we suffer too many casualties.

1118 CG to CO: Has msg to 1st Bn been sent yet? Ans: have just finished putting in into brief form so it is ready to be send now. Arty registering on 332588, 1000yards to Co E front. Action taken: CO gave msg to co 1st Bn.

1150 S2 to S3: Msg received from 1st Bn: felled trees and one AT gun at Rd block; need Engrs to clear. Sending force to block now 0800. At 0855 received msg: ready to move by rd block to contact mission force and atk enemy from behind. At 0920: Engrs have to neutralize mine. At 0830 co 1st Bn sent following msg: strong friendly force advancing to meet you now. Ans: Msg will have to be dropped to 1st Bn or send one man to try and get through.

1201 G4 to ExO: Want to arrange for dropping supplies by plane to 1st Bn. It will take
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS  Excerpts from the 442nd Journals

minimum 12 hrs to get planes over 1st Bn area.

S3 to ExO: CO wants planes ready loaded with supplies so if need them, can get them in few minutes notice.

1202 ExO to 131FA: Is it possible to get cub plane to fly over 1st Bn to contact arty FO? Ans: 1st Bn received Co’s msg at 1205.

1212 Div Lo to CO: CG wants 1st Bn atk back; from msg sent to 1st Bn does not get that idea. Ans: 1st Bn very low on ammo and do not believe it could put on a strong atk. CO to Div Lo: 1st Bn near rd block now, don’t fire any arty in that area unless cleared by the 1st Bn FO

1240 S3 to S2: Msg from 1st Bn: we have sent patrol as ordered; one way to contact friendly force; pos unknown; believe until PTs 8 and N Msg believe sent before 1st Bn received Co’s msg.

1312 CO 1st Bn to CO: Msg from 1st Bn: 50 enemy at Pt 8, some at Pts N and 7. 28 injured.

1337 131 FA to S3 1st Bn request me to fire between Pts. 8 and N:

1340 CO to 1st Bn: Msg to 1st Bn: move troops through to pt 30 contacting our kind (CoK) 300 yards SE at Pt 30. Arty will fall 300 yrds E of Pt N Jerries in the same position as my first msg. Orders will be issued at Pt 30.

1422 1st Bn to CO: Msg: Request permission to remain at position until tomorrow. Will not be possible to reach pos 10 at daylight due to casualties. Second msg: before moving must know outcome combat patrol which is half our strength. 1440 CO to 1st Bn: Msg: we are attacking at 1600 for Pt 9. Atk preceded by 10 min concentration close to Pt N. Continue to attempt via Pt 9 and Pt 30 as instructed in previous msg. Acknowledge.

1600 ExO to G4: Did you receive msg asking for material to be made ready for dropping to 1st Bn? Ans: Yes but must have 12 hrs notice; supplies must have a specific time and place to drop before starting material. What supplies do you want dropped?

ExO to CO: Make up supplies to be dropped: two days supply K rations and water, medical supplies, one case 45 cal ammo, one case carbine ammo, two cases MG, 4 cases M1 ammo 30 cal. Comm officer want following btry supplies dropped; four BA 70, six BA39, two BA 40. Will give them coord 349573 as place to drop supplies and 0800 as time; otherwise they will not drop it. At 0800 in morning it will be misty to fly mission, thus we will have it on call

1720 G3 to CO: Msg by radio: stopped by strong enemy force dug in at pos 10. Flanking stopped by heavy mine field covered by MG: withdrew to old LD pos.

1750 G3 to CO: Supplies ready to be dropped.

1800 CO to 1st Bn: We will drop food, ammo and water to you at clearing in wood at 344574 tomorrow morning after 0800. Display panels, smoke or something white; tell us which.
1840 1st Bn to CO: Radio msg: Medical supplies needed; no rations for 3 days; 7 now casualties. Where is our patrol which moved this day in order to meet mission force. Need ammo before atk possible.

1905 CG to CO: Do you have contact with 1st Bn? Ans: Periodically by radio. Ans: Believe it is good idea to bring 1st Bn out in open ground across to Biffontaine. Ans: This plan has already been discussed but don’t believe it is good due to litter cases. Ans: I do not order you to leave wounded, but Bn must be gotten out tonight.

1912 G3 to S3: Air drop of supplies to 1st Bn to take place at 0800 if weather conditions permit; if weather interferes, it will take place at first opportune time. All AA units and other units interested have been notified. Plane will probably be a fighter bomber.

2010 1st Bn to CcO: Radio msg: Small clearing around our pos will mark with white a row and if possible yellow smoke at 0745. 2nd msg: Request rations, ammo, fags, medical supply so enemy will not observe and inform enemy of our pos. Have you heard from our patrol?

2145 Co to 1st Bn: Supplies will be sent; patrol not contacted. Send up smoke when plane appears.

2310 Co to 1st Bn: Aircraft will drop supplies at 1100. Strong friendly force coming."