Salerno to Cassino Campaign Part I
September 9, 1943 - October 31, 1943

16 days before the 133rd Regiment of the 34th Division moved to Oran the British Eighth Army had invaded the tip of the Italian peninsula.

9 September - The Allied Fifth Army (composed of the British 10th Corps and the American VI Corps) had made an amphibious assault on the beaches of the Gulf of Salerno, south of Naples. The Fifth Army landing was intended to secure the Salerno plain as a jumping-off place for a swing northwest to seize Naples, whose fine harbor and airfields would make it a good base for further offensive operations. Allied troops moving east from Salerno might also be able to cut off German units being pushed north by the Eighth Army.

For a time it had looked as though the Fifth Army forces might be thrown back into the sea, but their line had held.

15 September - The Germans had gone on the defensive, making only minor jabs at the beachhead, where Fifth Army was rapidly consolidating its positions and receiving reinforcements of men and supplies.

The German strategy now planned stubborn resistance before the 10th Corps, on the Allied left, nearest Naples, to allow time to wreck the city's port installations and protect a withdrawal to the north. Delaying action before any eastward drive by the VI Corps would keep open an avenue of escape for German troops being pushed north by the Eighth Army. An orderly general withdrawal would end with the Wehrmacht's forces in position along the line of the Volturno River, western section of a barrier of strong defenses which stretched across the whole of the Italian peninsula. It had been planned originally that the 34th Division would join the Fifth Army at Naples twenty-one days after the initial landings at Salerno. Fierce German resistance had changed the Allied time table, however, and the division left Oran for the beachhead.

19 September - The 100th traveled in the S. S. Frederick Funston, one of four ships assigned to the 133rd Regiment and its equipment. Friendly planes covered the last part of the journey and were overhead at 8:00 A.M.

22 September - as the transports reached their stations off the beachhead. Two hours later men began going down rope ladders into landing barges. Once on shore they climbed along tape-marked paths to higher ground. Looking back they could see barges and ducks shuttling between ships and shore, countless jeeps, trucks, and antitank guns and howitzers emerging from the yawning bows of the landing craft, all to the tune of roaring motors, shouted commands, and explosions, as demolition crews blew up wrecked equipment. No enemy shells fell in the landing area. That night one AJA wrote, "I never saw such efficiency in my life. The Power of the American Army was at work. I wished I had a camera—a sight I'll never forget. This convinced me that a nation like ours can't be beaten in the war."

The battalion's "extra" companies, E and F, were assigned guard duty in the beach area, E at an ammunition dump, F at a temporary airstrip which had been leveled off for use by P40s. The
other companies marched off the dunes via more taped paths onto hot dusty roads. A six-mile hike brought them to a bivouac area.

The big Allied push out of the Salerno plain began the next day, the 23rd. Two days later the 34th Division entered the chase after the Germans, now in retreat, and the 133rd Infantry received orders to truck twenty-five miles east to the vicinity of Montecorvino-Rovella. As the regiment moved into action this message was being sent to officers of all Fifth Army units: "There has recently arrived in this theater a battalion of American soldiers of Japanese ancestry. These troops take particular pride in their American origin. Your command should be so informed in order that during the stress and confusion of combat, cases of mistaken identity may be avoided."

At Montecorvino the 133rd received orders to move to the vicinity of Oliveto Citra in the 45th Division sector on the right flank of the Fifth Army line. It would operate as a combat team under personal direction of General Ryder, commander of the 34th Division, and would proceed north and west to cut the main road leading from Avellino to Benevento, key road center on the route of enemy retreat to the Volturno River line. The 3rd Division would simultaneously drive northeast against Avellino. On the 133rd's right the 45th Division would guard the Fifth Army's flank and maintain contact with the British Eighth Army.

The 133rd would first secure the road west from Montemarano to Avellino and would be prepared, if necessary, to assist in the capture of the latter town. It would then proceed northwest to cut the Avellino-Benevento road, along which the Germans would be attempting retreat.

26 September - The 100th moved 106 miles by truck on the narrow mountainous Contursi-Teora-Lioni-S. Angelo road to a point about ten miles past Lioni. Here it left the main highway for a secondary route which curved first southwest, then northwest, to meet the S. Angelo-Montemarano road. The autumn rains had begun, and that night, for the first time, the men slept surrounded by Italian mud.

Next morning, on the S. Angelo-Montemarano road, the 100th waded across the Galore River at a place where the bridge had been blown. The men pushed ahead on foot; their transport would come up when a temporary bridge had been blown. Occasional shells fell along the road but they met no Germans. As pioneers moved ahead to spot and clear mines they found some already marked by Italian civilians. In bivouac that night on the eastern outskirts of Montemarano most of the men slept in pup tents, the luckier soldiers in farmhouses and stables. It was still raining.

Next morning an Italian civilian reported that a German soldier who had been hiding in a nearby farmhouse wished to surrender. A squad from Company B brought him in, the battalion's first prisoner. He could speak a little English, and said that his mother was Irish, and his father had lived for a time in London. He asked if his captors were Chinese. Informed that they were Japanese, he registered some confusion. Had Japan, like Italy, betrayed the Fuehrer?

The battalion remained in Montemarano all day. Here a squad leader became the unit's first casualty—a passing jeep exploded a land mine and one of the fragments gave him a slight face wound.
During the afternoon the trucks again appeared. There was a terrific downpour during the night and it was still raining at 6:00 o'clock next morning as the vehicles churned forward through the mud. Bolstered by a regimental antitank platoon, the 100th was now to act as advance guard for the Combat Team.

Company B led off, out of Montemarano, off the Avellino road, and along a secondary route north through the village of Castelvetere toward high ground around Chiusano. At about 10:00 A.M., as the 3rd Platoon turned a bend in the road, three German machine guns opened up, and mortar and artillery shells began to fall around the "zeroed in" road curve. Sergeant Shigeo (Joe) Takata said, "It's the first time, so I'm going first." Spotting one of the Jerry nests, he walked toward it, firing his automatic rifle. A piece of shrapnel caught him in the head. Dying, he managed to tell one of his men, who had crawled close, where the German gunners were. Before the enemy pocket was silenced another soldier had died and seven more had been wounded. The 100th had its first hero and its first claim for Purple Heart awards.

Around noon there was another check at another demolished bridge. As usual, enemy artillery had the crossing place and its neighborhood zeroed in, but despite the occasional shells thrown into the area there were no casualties. Again the trucks had to wait and again the riflemen got out and walked.

These two halts within two hours gave the men a taste of the Germans' withdrawal tactics. As their main forces moved north in good order they left behind small groups of motorized infantry supported by roving self-propelled cannon. These rear-guard fighters concentrated sudden resistance at points where they could hold the Americans back with least danger to themselves, dealt as many casualties as possible, and then ran back to their troop carriers to be driven to other favorable defensive sites. Enemy artillery kept a bead on the mined roads and destroyed bridges which the retreating army left in its wake. All the way to the Volturno American advance elements could hear the roar of German demolition charges. Mines were sown wherever the pursuing troops might attempt to build bypasses and, where the terrain made it impossible to do anything else, American engineers had to push Bailey bridges across the old abutments.

In mid afternoon, after passing a junction with a road which led northeast from Chiusano, the 100th received orders to move quickly cross-country toward that town, now only about two miles away. A small mechanized enemy force retreating before the 3rd Division would probably try to use a road leading north from a junction on Chiusano's western outskirts. Hurrying to get across the road first, the battalion experienced the heaviest artillery fire so far. There were a number of casualties, and the medical aid men had a chance to show their mettle. By 7:00 P.M., despite the shells, elements of the battalion were on high ground covering the junction.

Most of the enemy fire had been coming from the direction of Montefalcione, about three miles north of Chiusano. Company A was left to guard the Chiusano junction, and the other units moved up the road which ran northeast from the town. After traveling a half mile the column left the road and climbed down into a valley. At its broader end to the northwest, on a road which the Germans might use in retreat, lay Montefalcione. It was pitch dark as the men moved silently up the valley, walking over vegetable patches and groping through grapevine trellises. Dogs...
challenged their coming, but no mines went off and there was no enemy fire. By midnight the battalion entered the outskirts of the village without opposition, and found that the enemy had cleared out. At dawn a private on outpost duty spotted three hostile armored reconnaissance cars moving up the road from the south. Using a rifle grenade, he damaged the lead vehicle with his first shot, and all three cars turned and fled the way they had come.

In the morning, as the 100th rested in the little stone hamlet, the 1st Battalion moved through on its way to establish a roadblock at Pratola. The 3rd followed, heading for Highway No. 7, which it would cut about three miles northwest of Montemiletto. Though held up for a while before Pratola by fire from enemy half-tracks, the 1st managed to push through and to set up its roadblock, helped by pressure on the north from the 3rd, which moved quickly through Montemiletto and then up the La Serra-Montefusco road toward Benevento.

**Our KIA losses for 29 September, 1943**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 B</td>
<td>Sgt. Takata, Shigeo Joe</td>
<td>Waialua, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 D</td>
<td>Pvt. Tanaka, Keichi</td>
<td>Waimanalo, HI</td>
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**Our KIA loss for 30 September, 1943**

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>100 D</td>
<td>Cpl. Ishii, George F</td>
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**1 October** - 100th, moved from Montefalcone to follow the 3rd Battalion, and reached Montemiletto that evening. Patrols were unable to establish contact with the 3rd. It rained all night and was still pouring when the 100th pushed off again the next afternoon. After crossing Highway 7 above Montemiletto and moving northwest along minor roads, the battalion entered Highway No. 7 again at S. Giorgio. Orders were to move ahead on that road on the right flank of the regiment's advance towards Benevento. The rest of the twenty-mile march was made in darkness, through mud and cold windy rain. Bridges were down; the road was pocked with mine and shell holes; and the machine-gun and mortar men had to hand-carry their weapons and ammunition. A platoon of the 45th Reconnaissance Troop had entered Benevento during the day and had reported the city empty of Germans, who had moved north across the Calore River, but enemy artillery in the hills north of that stream still pounded at road junctions and stream crossings, and the gunners seemed to know every bend on the approach roads. Shells fell on and to the sides of Highway 7 but no one in the 100th were hit.

Things were not going so well for the 3rd Battalion, 133rd Regt. on the left. Shortly before midnight, just outside Benevento, Company K reported a good many of its men wounded. A little later, as one of K Companies platoons reached a street corner on the outskirts, a shell exploded in the midst of a group of soldiers huddled under an awning and almost simultaneously another fell only a few yards away. The two bursts killed eleven and wounded twenty-two.

Exhausted from hours of slogging through and diving into mud, the men of the 100th passed through rubble-filled Benevento at about 1:00 A.M. Lovell led the column in single file, through alleyways across the city's southwest edge and out again. Crossing tobacco fields and small creeks, then the Montesarchio road, then a railroad farther west, the battalion finally halted and took up positions on two 200-foot hills which lay in the angle between the railroad and the Calore.
River. From this position the unit could protect the regiment’s left flank and provide supporting
fire for the 3rd Battalion, which had orders to cross the Calore north of the city and establish a
bridgehead on the north bank. The 1st Battalion was to take position southeast of Benevento, on
the right flank.

Turner did not reach the hills until daybreak. He had been with transportation, which was
supposed to reach the objective first, but had been delayed by a blown bridge. After meeting
casualties of the 3rd Battalion outside Benevento, he had been worried about his own boys, but
had been reassured after talking with Lovell by radio.

Too badly disorganized to make the intended dawn crossing, the 3rd battalion did not reach the
Calore's north bank until afternoon.

Engineers began setting up a Bailey bridge to replace the old arch, destroyed by the enemy.
Shellfire held up their work.

4 October - Troops of the 45th Division moved in from the right flank of the Fifth Army, crossed the
new span, and took over.

The 34th Division now went into assembly areas, and the 133rd Regiment camped about ten miles
southwest of Benevento near S. Martino. Since Salerno the 100th had lost three men killed,
twenty-three wounded. 13 had been injured in accidents, five when a medical section jeep turned
over on the way to Benevento. Though the weather was clear at S. Martino it began to rain.

7 October - As the battalion trucked north to bivouac at Montesarchio. After eight days here, a "Filthy
town with Human *kukai* all over the street. One has to weave around." The unit moved through
Airola and S. Agata into Bagnoli. As the column went through Airola children threw apples to
the men in the trucks and adults happily shrieked, "Chinee? Chinee?" At Bagnoli, where
Companies E and F rejoined the outfit, a hundred copies of the 34th’s news bulletin were
distributed. The bulletin contained a report from General Mark W. Clark, Fifth Army
commander, to General Dwight Eisenhower, commander of all American forces in Europe, in
which the 100th was given a pat on the back for its behavior in the advance from Montemarano
to Montefalcione. * This was good for morale. "Though glum of the weather and with the fresh
and bitter taste of battle within them the men's spirits were alleviated by the note of
appreciation," wrote the battalion historian. During this period General Ryder gave his AJA
troops another token of acceptance and esteem—the Red Bull shoulder patch.

* On 26 October, Washington headquarters of the Army Ground Forces sent a letter to the
commanding generals of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Armies, and the 4th, 13th, and 18th, Corps, all in
the United States. This message quoted a War Department memorandum on the 100th’s behavior
in its first battle test, and asked that the content thereof be made known to all military personnel
in units or installations to which AJA soldiers were assigned. The following quotation is from this
letter: "A strong desire to be with their unit as it entered combat reduced absences due to
sickness and hospitalization almost to zero. While the Japanese-American battalion was acting
as the advance guard for a regimental combat team, the battalion advanced approximately
fifteen miles in twenty-four hours, operating day and night in the face of strong enemy resistance
and over difficult terrain. Although suffering casualties their advance continued on schedule. All of its weapons were used with complete assurance. A Japanese-American Sergeant who lost his life in this action has been recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross." A copy also came to 100th Battalion Headquarters.

In connection with the Volturno fighting, General Clark later wrote: "I should mention that a bright spot in this period was the performance of the 100th Battalion, which had recently been assigned to the 34th Division...

"On the march to the Volturno, which was their first time in combat, they acted as an advance guard for a regimental combat team and covered a distance of almost twenty miles in twenty-four hours, despite the extreme difficulties of the mountain road. I sent a cable to Eisenhower on October 8, stating that they had seized their objective and that they were quick to react whenever the enemy offered opposition." Calculated Risk (New York, 1950). p. 220

15 October - The 133rd remained in reserve while the 135th and 168th pushed across the Volturno River at Limatola, south of Caiazzo. As the 34th Division moved northwest it would again have to cross this stream where it looped back across the path of advance. The 133rd was assigned the middle sector of the second crossing, in which the 168th would attack against Dragoni on the south side of the river, the 135th, on the right, would cross the Volturno to take Alife on the north side, and the 133rd would attack north and northwest to secure a bridgehead on the Dragoni-Alife road.

18 October - The 133rd Regiment had made its first crossing of the Volturno south of Caiazzo and was advancing under intermittent artillery fire to take part in the division's second crossing. When the regiment reached the Volturno its 1st Battalion would make a fording on the right and then move west along the north bank; the 100th would follow to the left rear of the 1st and take position on the south bank; and the 3rd would move last and farther west, maintaining contact below the river with the 168th Regiment.

The 1st Battalion missed the crossing point and waded the Volturno, about two miles downstream, under the protective smoke cover from our mortars. It pushed rapidly northwest along the north bank toward the bridge on the Dragoni-Alife road. Division Headquarters sent a message that the 1st must capture the span before the Germans could destroy it, but when the battalion was only a mile away the bridge was blown.

After passing Alvignano late in the afternoon the 100th left the main road and moved directly north toward the Volturno, sometimes on secondary roads, sometimes cross-country through vineyards and orchards and over creeks. It was well after dark when the column reached the river and began to move west along its south bank. The Jerries were sending over sporadic mortar and small-arms fire. At dawn the battalion was dug in along the Dragoni-Alife road, south of the ruined bridge. The 3rd Battalion met heavier resistance near Dragoni, but by dawn had taken positions along a railroad track a mile east of the town. During the 19th all units remained in place. Some "friendly" mortar shells fell in the 100th's area and, though no one was hurt, there was plenty of cursing.
Shortly after midnight, the 100th waded the chill, waist-deep river. The 3rd Battalion also crossed during the night, bringing all regimental elements to the north bank. The next day was used in making ready for a night attack against S. Angelo D'Alife, seven miles northwest on one of the foothills of the Matese range. Patrols reported that the valley through which the regiment would have to advance was heavily mined and laced with machine-gun positions manned by troops of the tough 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. These Jerries made reconnaissance so difficult that some patrols, pinned down by fire, had to call for mortar fire and smoke shells to cover their withdrawal.

Colonel Ray Fountain, the 33rd's commander, told his officers to expect heavy resistance. German artillery had excellent observation overlooking the valley, and battalion leaders must get their troops out of the flats and to the less exposed slopes of the foothills before daylight. If a battalion were stopped it should move to the right, away from the river, toward this higher ground. The attack would be in column of battalions, the 100th leading, the 1st coming abreast later, and the 3rd in reserve. The 100th would seize the upper road junction 1,000 yards east of S. Angelo; the 1st would take the lower. The 135th Infantry would be attacking on the right through Alife. There would be no rolling barrage, but the artillery would fire concentrations on request.

Company A led off in the dark at about 7:00 P.M. As the men advanced through grape trellises and vegetable gardens, or following the walls of irrigation canals, only occasional enemy shells fell in the area of attack. At about 10:30, as scouts approached one of several farmhouses along the valley floor, a door opened, and light shone forth. Moments later German machine guns opened up a constant rattle. Within a few minutes ten men of Company A were dead and about twenty had been wounded. The flats were covered with a horizontal rain of bullets; the tracers showing how neatly the enemy had interlocked his fields of fire. To continue to advance would be suicide. The greatest safety lay behind or in some kind of hummock or hollow, though these gave little protection against the mortar and artillery shells which plastered the area. Turner ordered his men to find what cover they could, directed his mortars to try to silence the Jerry gun nests, and sent runners back to ask for support. Some men of Company A, managed to get within a few yards of German machine guns before being hit, but most of that night's notable deeds occurred as men tried to fight their way back to safety. Using an automatic rifle to cover his squad's withdrawal, Pfc Thomas Yamanaga silenced an enemy gun, by firing, and so won the battalion's second Distinguished Service Cross. Lieutenant James Vaughn crawled around to encourage his men, and then wriggled to the rear to ask for fire support. Ordered to return and move his platoon back, though wounded himself, he covered their withdrawal with his carbine. Private Tad Shikiya, who left his own hole to drag a moaning buddy to safety, died in the attempt. Moving around on his stomach, Private Satoshi Kadota, a medic, treated twelve casualties. Corporal Donald Hayashi took over a squad when his sergeant was wounded, gave first aid, and, for nearly two hours, covered his men's retreat single-handed. These and similar actions earned Silver Star awards.

When Turner reached the regimental command post and reported his battalion's situation, Colonel Fountain told him to pull his men back; the 1st Battalion would take over the attack. Turner protested; he had sent a platoon off to the left to envelope the German fire; if this lifted the pressure his men would advance again. No, said Fountain, he was to get his men out. Turner went back to see to it. The 1st Battalion now moved forward, angling to the right of the 100th, a...
bit nearer the hills. It, too, got pasted, and had to dig for cover. Meanwhile those elements of the 100th which could move back did so and angled to the right, behind the 1st Battalion, toward Alife. By dawn Companies A and B had passed through the western outskirts of Alife, which the 135th Regiment had occupied, and were in bivouac around a cemetery near the road leading northwest from that town toward S. Angelo. They were now behind the 3rd Battalion, which was farther north on the road, where German resistance had not been so strong.

When the early morning mists lifted, the 1st Battalion was still out in the most exposed part of the valley. Under enemy counterattack it was now forced back toward the vicinity of the Dragoni Alife Bridge. During the afternoon Company C of the 100th moved up the road past Alife to rejoin A and B. The rest of the day was spent in reorganization and preparation for an attack to be made the next morning.

**Our KIA losses for 18 October, 1943**

- 100 A Pvt. Fujimoto, Toshiaki Koloa, HI
- 100 D Pfc. Miyasato, Isami Puunene, HI

**Our KIA losses for 21 October, 1943**

- 100 A Pfc. Arakawa, Harold J Puunene, HI
- 100 A Sgt. Ozawa, George Y Honolulu, HI
- 100 A Pvt. Shikiya, Ted T Honolulu, HI
- 100 A Pvt. Shimabuku, Roy K Honolulu, HI
- 100 A Pvt. Takei, Yoshinobu Puunene, HI
- 100 A Cpl. Toyama, Richard K Hamakua, HI
- 100 A Cpl. Yamanaga, Thomas I Honolulu, HI

**22 October** - The 3rd and 100th Battalions pushed off again, the 3rd heading for the upper road junction, the 100th for the lower. By nightfall neither unit had reached its objective, nor were the men of both scattered along the valley slopes. This was the day soldiers of the 100th first heard the marrow-freezing moan of shells from the six-barreled electrically fired German rocket guns, the Nebelwerfers or "screaming-meemies." Eleven enemy tanks roamed directly ahead and on the left flank along the river bank. A bazooka shot, fired by a member of the 100th, destroyed one of these Mark II's, and a Piper Cub, circling the area during the afternoon, helped division artillery smash another tank and cripple four more, but the rest were still making trouble when night came. After dark the 3rd and the 100th moved onto higher ground and by early morning had secured both road junctions. Major Lovell was hit by a Nebelwerfer fragment as he led a patrol, and was sent to the rear for hospitalization.

The next day the 3rd Battalion moved up the terraced sides of Hill 630, behind and northeast of S. Angelo, and the 100th pushed westward in front of the town, intending to flank it by an attack on Hill 529 to its northwest. By night the 3rd was in possession of Hill 630, but the 100th had not yet reached Hill 529.
Our KIA losses for 23 October, 1943

100 C  Pfc. Ajitomi, Matsuei Lahaina, HI
100 C  Pvt. Naganuma, Martin M Lahaina, HI
C  Pfc. Nagata, Hideo Paia, HI
100 A  Pfc. Naito, Kaoru Lihue, HI
100 C  Pvt. Riu, Masatsugu Wailuku, HI
100 D  Pvt. Fukuyama, Kaoru Honolulu, HI
100 D  Pvt. Hamanaka, Fred Y Honolulu, HI
100 C  Pvt. Hirayama, Yutaka Mana, HI
100 C  Pvt. Kaya, Satoshi Ewa, HI
100 A  Pfc. Morihara, Arthur Akira Kealakekua, HI
100 C  Pfc. Murakami, Sakae Honokaa, HI
100 A  S/Sgt. Murashige, Richard K Lihue, HI
100 C  S/Sgt. Sakamoto, Louis K Waihee, HI

24 October - The 1st Battalion, reorganized and rested, moved without resistance through the narrow streets of S. Angelo, from which the Germans had pulled back into ridges directly to the north. At the same time Companies A and C of the 100th attacked frontally against Hill 529, on whose bare cone-shaped tip stood the ruins of an old castle. A low mist made enemy artillery ineffective, but there were stubborn knots of Jerries on the forward slopes. Little progress was made during the day. When darkness came Turner sent Companies E and F to relieve A and C. In the morning the new units moved northwest, avoiding further frontal attack, to get around behind "Castle Hill," and the 1st Battalion moved from S. Angelo to flank it from the northeast. In midmorning the Jerries made their last sally, but this was repulsed with the aid of 200 rounds from the 100th’s 81-mm. mortars. By noon the Germans, in danger of being pocketed, began moving down Hill 529 and into the ridges northwest of Raviscanina. The 135th Infantry now prepared to push through the 133rd to take up the pursuit.

S. Angelo and its commanding heights had been secured, but it had taken five days to move seven miles north of the Dragoni-Alife Bridge. Along the valley and its surrounding ridges the enemy's machine guns had fired from strongly built cleverly concealed pillboxes. Stone walls and stone farmhouses had given the Jerry riflemen protection, and German observers had directed accurate artillery and tank fire from the hills above. Troop carriers, some of them big enough for thirty men, had shuttled back and forth, placing soldiers where needed. Some areas had been sown with mines, and booby traps had lurked in grape arbors, farmhouses, and abandoned gun positions. The 133rd counted 59 men killed and 148 wounded as a result of this action. Twenty-one members of the 100th were dead, sixty-seven had been wounded, and four second lieutenants and a major had been hospitalized.

As he prepared to pursue the Germans, the commander of the 135th Regiment asked Turner for a reconnaissance report on enemy dispositions along the Alife-Pratella road. Turner sent out a patrol, and the lieutenant in command returned with a report that there were no enemy troops along the highway, but when the 3rd Battalion of the 135th moved up the road that night, it ran into enemy fire and lost four men. A patrol from Company C of the 100th, detailed to guide the 135th’s, 2nd Battalion to its line of departure for an attack toward Ailano, lost its way in the darkness.
26 October - The 2nd found itself several hundred yards north of its intended jumping-off-place. When the early morning fog lifted, that unit was immediately pinned down by enemy rifle and machine-gun fire. These incidents were reported to division headquarters, and also a complaint that the 100th’s vehicles had been so scattered along the highway that they had delayed the 135th’s night advance.

25 to 31 October - The 133rd was in divisional reserve, and the 100th remained near S. Angelo. The field kitchen came up and there were hot meals; some supplies which had been left behind in North Africa arrived; and the men could now bathe and scrub off a two-week accumulation of mud. When a stray enemy shell whistled low over his head, an English war correspondent managed to get into a hole faster than the battalion officers he had been interviewing. A wounded German prisoner who was being treated by Doc Kawasaki was much puzzled when the battalion surgeon denied Chinese ancestry. The man’s eyes bulged. “Tokyo?” he gasped.

On this, as on other similar occasions, the AJAs sometimes took grim pleasure in letting captured representatives of the "master race" guess their nationality— at times they jokingly assured their befuddled prisoners that Japan had joined Germany’s enemies. It was, indeed, often easier to convince them of this than of the truth—that these soldiers with Japanese faces were American citizens. When that fact finally did dawn on some of the Jerries, they shook their heads in perplexity. “Ach, these Amerikaner!”

During this period Turner was ordered to a hospital for rest. His superiors probably felt that an infantry battalion needed a younger, tougher officer who might be more ready to see his men shot up. The Old Man going? It was hard for the men to believe. Had they let him down during this last action? And Lovell, the officer who after Turner they would most willingly have followed, was in a hospital wounded. Turner called his boys together for a last talk. He was lucky, he told them, headed for a nice soft bed and then probably for the States. He knew how the men felt about Turner, and could guess what they were thinking. “Look,” he said, “I was happy with my own outfit, and I didn’t ask for this job. I’m sorry you guys have lost your Pop, but believe me, before you’re through you’re going to lose more than one commander. Let’s work together and make the best of it.”

A graduate from the ranks, Gillespie was a good officer as well as a straight talker, a cool, quick-thinking tactician in battle, and a leader who deserved respect and confidence. He was also a good prophet—one month after he joined the battalion he, too, went to the hospital.
On the last day of October - The 1st and 3rd battalions climbed over steep brush-covered ridges to attack and occupy Ciorlano and the high ground north and northwest of that village. The 100th followed in reserve. Shortly after dawn of the next day six hedge-hopping Messerschmidts strafed Companies A and C as they toiled across the hills and twelve men were hit. Also hurt was a soldier who had been reading a comic book in what he thought was a safe hole—he received a foot wound from a fragment of an American antiaircraft shell. During the approach march, enemy shrapnel killed six men and wounded nine.

Our KIA loss for 30 October, 1943

100 D Pfc. Nishihara, Kazuo Puunene, HI
**Salerno to Cassino Campaign Part II**

**November 1, 1943 - January 16, 1944**

**1 November** - The 1st and 3rd battalions had occupied Ciorlano and the nearby heights overlooking the Volturno, and were moving down into its valley. During the day the 168th Regiment moved into Capriati. The 34th Division faced another river crossing.

In this area the Volturno was no great obstacle. It flowed through willow clumped little islands at a depth seldom over two feet, and its waters spread no more than 800 feet at the widest point. The valley, covered with grain fields, vineyards, olive groves, and orchards, was less than two miles in width at Roccaravindola, on the right of the division's sector, and broadened to only five miles before Venafro, on the left. Once the Americans had crossed this level terrain, however, they would have to advance into bald and rugged mountains along whose crests the enemy had set up a strong defensive line. The Germans intended to hold the attacking forces here until they could complete an even more formidable barrier farther to the northwest. Steep cliffs and deep canyons would make advance difficult, and only narrow unpaved roads or mule tracks crossed the hills. Troops would have to attack up mountain sides, and climb trails which jeeps could not negotiate. Supplies would have to be carried by mule train and, where the beasts couldn't make it, on the backs of riflemen.

**Our KIA loss for 2 November, 1943**

100 C Pvt. Hidaka, Eiji Honolulu, HI
100 E Pvt. Suzuki, Takashi Nawiliwili, HI

**3 November** - The 34th Division would move across the Volturno against Roccaravindola and Santa Maria Olivetto, preliminary objectives in a push towards Colli al Volturno, farther north. The 168th Regiment would attack toward the first village, and on its left the 133rd would move against Santa Maria and the hills southwest of that town. Both units would cross Route 85, which ran from Venafro to Isernia, and prevent its possible use as a path of German escape. The 179th Regiment of the 45th Division would move across the Volturno at the same time as the 34th and take Venafro.

Colonel Charley L. Marshall, former executive officer of the 133rd, was now its commander. On the afternoon of 3 November he explained his plan of attack. The 3rd Battalion would cross the Volturno first, driving on Santa Maria; the 1st would follow, but after wading the river would move left to seize Hill 550 northwest of Santa Maria. The 100th would ford farther downstream, taking ground to the rear and left of the 1st Battalion, and protecting the division's left flank and rear. German tanks and self-propelled guns were operating in this part of the valley, using olive groves for concealment, and armored enemy counterattack was to be expected. Reconnaissance showed that the flats west of the Volturno were heavily mined and booby-trapped. Between 11:30 and 12:00 P.M. an artillery concentration would pound the valley floor and the heights on the other side.

At midnight, jump-off time, the 100th had moved down from the heights about Ciorlano into the muddy delta formed by the junction of the little Sava River and the Volturno. Companies E and
B led off into the chill water. On reaching the middle of the waist-deep stream they were held up for twenty minutes while “shorts” from American artillery dropped in the water ahead of them and on the west bank. Finally the fire lifted, and the men went ahead. On leaving the river the lead companies hit a thick field of S and Teller mines. Trip wires went to grapevines, fruit trees, and haystacks and varicolored flares swished up to floodlight the valley. In an area of about a hundred square yards thirty men were hit and from then on the medics were busy. In their posts on the heights to the east, American artillery observers could check the progress of the 100th and its brother battalions by the sound of the mine explosions which punctuated the roar of mortar and artillery fire.

Lieutenant Kurt E. Schemel of C Company, the young man who had doubted whether he should join the battalion, was killed shortly after he climbed the river's west bank. He was the 100th’s first commissioned officer to die in battle.

Captain Taro Suzuki and Lieutenant Young O. Kim, scouting ahead of Company B, moved north along the side of a dirt road running northwest to Highway 85. As they approached a junction with another track leading west to 85, enemy bullets whistled in from the right. Kim yelped and fell off the road on the right; Suzuki jumped for a ditch on the left. Their men, strung out behind them along a low stone wall on Suzuki's side of the road, wheeled their weapons toward the sound of the enemy fire and let fly. The attached machine-gun section propped its guns on the walls and opened up. Staff Sergeant Robert Ozaki came up to Suzuki, who said he thought Kim had been wounded or captured. As Ozaki ordered his platoon to fix bayonets for attack the words spread down the line, and when Ozaki's men charged screaming across wall and road a good part of the rest of the company went along. The sally bagged two panicry Germans; the rest had fled after the counterblast which followed their original fire. Kim was found safe, alone, and still a bit dazed from his fall. He had probably been in more danger from his rescuers than from the Jerries. Someone later claimed that this was the first American bayonet attack in Italy.

Meanwhile a wire team of six men and a mule wandered off the projected route of advance, and the sergeant in charge decided to follow a road which he thought would bring his group back in contact with the rear of the column. It was not a good idea: the Germans had machine guns trained on all the roads, and two of them opened up on the wire party, killing three men. As the mule dashed into an olive grove, his reel making a great racket, a cascade of enemy bullets cut him to ribbons. When Company E finally spotted and silenced the German gunners the rest of the communication team crawled to safety along a ditch.

By 2:30 A.M. Companies E and B had crossed Route 85 about two hundred yards west of the Volturno and were dug in along a railroad track which ran through a depression in the valley floor. Other elements of the battalion were in olive groves between track and river. At about 5:30 A.M. the Germans threw a heavy mortar barrage against the railroad cut. It lasted half an hour, and preceded a less concentrated but steady shelling which continued throughout the day. At times enemy half-tracks rolled within a few hundred yards of the 100th’s positions to deliver machine gun and cannon fire.

Twice Jerry planes skimmed over, dropping antipersonnel bombs. During the rest of the day the battalion remained where it was, while A and C companies, in reserve, sent out patrols to maintain contact with the 179th Infantry on the left. By midnight eight men had been killed and forty-two wounded.
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS

Extracted from "Ambassador in Arms: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion by Thomas D. Murphy

Our KIA losses for 3 November, 1943

100 E/F Lt. Schemel, Kurt E Unknown
100 F Cpl. Hashizume, Hisao Puhi, HI
100 F S/Sgt. Sato, Shukichi Lawai, HI
100 F Cpl. Tateyama, Haruyoshi H Kailua, HI

Our KIA losses for 4 November, 1943

100 Hq Pvt. Ski, George Honolulu, HI
100 E Cpl. Higashi, Harold Kahului, HI
100 E Pvt. Hiraki, Mitsuo Honolulu, HI
100 Hq Pvt. Hiratani, Himeo Wahiawa, HI
100 Hq Pvt. Ide, Edward Y Kaneohe, HI
100 E Pvt. Kawano, Tetsuo Honolulu, HI
100 B S/Sgt. Koyota, Edward Y Honolulu, HI
100 Hq Pfc. Kondo, Harushi Aiea, HI
100 D Pfc. Ota, Randall M Waipahu, HI
100 E Pvt. Wasada, Kenneth Y Honolulu, HI

5 November - A German bayonet charge pushed the 1st Battalion off Hill 550. Three hours later Colonel Marshall ordered Gillespie to take the 100th across the valley floor and seize Hills 590, 600, and 610, on the left of the 1st Battalion. This would take some pressure off that outfit, which would try to regain Hill 550.

Gillespie knew that to advance boldly in line of skirmishers across the open terrain, with enemy guns blasting down from the heights ahead, would be sheer carnage. The only cover for a direct frontal attack was a narrow ditch, about three feet deep, which ran obliquely from the railroad toward the hills. This would not do, however, since a long, thin line of men like that, if discovered, could be cut into segments and pounded to bits at leisure. Shells fell in the olive grove where the major and his officers studied an aerial photo of the sector. Finally Gillespie decided to try an end run of about a mile to the left through the less open terrain in the direction of the village of Pozzilli, in the 45th Division sector, and then swing back to the right, toward the hills.

Gillespie and Captain Alex McKenzie, commander of E Company, led the way. There was no time for careful reconnaissance, so they scouted ahead about a hundred yards at a time, signaling back to the men to follow. In column of twos, crouching low, crawling part of the time, E and F companies crossed a dirt road leading from Route 85 to Pozzilli, and then turned right and north. As Gillespie and McKenzie clambered up a dry creek bed, they spotted an American soldier ambling toward them from the direction of Pozzilli. He said his name was Thompson; he was a paratrooper AWOL from his outfit in Naples, "looking for some excitement." He had been through Pozzilli, which he reported deserted but full of mines and booby traps, and volunteered to guide the column along a covered route to the hills northeast of the village. His offer was accepted.
When the point of the battalion was still about half a mile from the base of the cliffs, an American Armored Forces major appeared, off to the left, driving a jeep madly up the road to Pozzilli. Clouds of dust rose behind him. Two German planes circled down to investigate, spotted the vehicle, and made strafing runs, but the jeep continued to careen up the road, toward which enemy artillery now began to send shells. Some of these fell near a part of the battalion column which was close to the road, and twenty men were hit. Curses as well as enemy shells followed the jeep driver as he roared out of view around a far bend.

Still unobserved (the enemy had seen only the jeep and its dust) the column came to the lower slopes of the hills at about 4:00 P.M. Here mines and booby traps barred advance. Lieutenant Lewis Key and Pfc Kenso Suga of Company E led a squad which cut trip wires, neutralized mines, and marked the path thus cleared with strips of toilet paper. Part of the column passed through safely, but then, as some soldiers wandered from the lane, several mines exploded. Captain John A. Johnson, Jr., battalion exec, and Captain Taro Suzuki were among those wounded.

Radio was being used to control the mile-long column. Two machine-gun sections from D, the heavy weapons company, were with E and F, the lead units, but the rest of the machine guns and the mortars were in the rear. The D Company men at the end of the column misunderstood a radio message and halted to await further orders. Only when the head of the column was almost three quarters of the way up the hills did word come forward that the heavy weapons men were no longer at its tail. This could be bad. Though it was dark now, and D Company had not yet crossed the mined area, it had to push through. As soon as the Germans discovered the battalion there would be an attack, and the heavier guns would be needed.

Thompson, the volunteer guide, joined the two riflemen who were sent back to lead Company D through the mines. About forty-five minutes later explosions were heard. Soon afterwards a report came forward that the heavy weapons men were again following the column but that a few soldiers had been hit. When the two riflemen who had acted as guides returned they reported that in trying to lead some of the Company D men to safety Thompson had tripped a mine and had been blown to bits. No dog tag, letters, or other identifying marks could be found as some hours later, after a steep climb, company E and F reached the crest of the first hill. At the top a soldier turned on his flashlight.

Someone hissed to him to douse it. He did, but the boys had seen that he was a Jerry. As he screamed and started to run he received a bullet in his back. For the next ten minutes there was heavy fire. When it ended, hand grenades had wiped out three German outposts. This had not been too difficult; the Germans had had strong dugouts on the side of the hill looking down toward the railroad and Highway 85, but had not expected an attack from the rear. The prisoners said they had thought that the Americans were still in the olive groves in the flats below. Perhaps easy living had made them negligent. Their dugouts contained eatables taken from nearby villages, as well as tinned rations and blankets, radios and binoculars, and half a butchered goat hung from a tree near one cave.

Company E spread over the first hill and, in anticipation of enemy counterattack, began digging slit trenches. No one knew whether this crest was 590, 600, or 610-there were plenty of other hills around—but it should be one of the objectives. Soldiers who had no picks used helmets and
pocket knives. Company F moved along the ridge line to the northwest, to another knob (later called 590), and also began to burrow. Lieutenant Kim led a patrol to make contact with the 1st Battalion on Hill 550, estimated to be about half a mile to the southeast, and on the way surprised a German supply party. In the firing that followed seven prisoners were taken. By dawn another hill to the north (later identified as 610) had been occupied.

Surprisingly, no enemy mortar or artillery fire fell on the captured positions during the night. Dawn brought a heavy concentration of shells, but only a few men were hit. There was frost on the ground and the men could see snow-capped peaks towering in the distance. At about 10:00 A.M., a column of Germans began moving up a draw parallel to the Company F front. They met a storm of small-arms and machine-gun fire backed by 60-mm. shells. Lieutenant Neill Ray and Corporals Bert Higashi and Katsushi Tanouye, observers from Company D, crouched on the lip of a mound forward of Company F’s riflemen.

Enemy shells exploded all around them, but they continued calmly to direct fire down upon the Jerries. Twice driven back, the Germans twice re-formed for attack. Each time the observers directed as many as forty rounds at them. Sticking to their vantage point until the sun was directly overhead, the three finally died together in the hail of wood and metal splinters which followed a tree burst. They were posthumously awarded Silver Stars. Soon afterwards the Germans withdrew, carrying their wounded, and leaving their dead strewn along the draw.

Despite occasional rain or snow flurries it was not too cold during the day but the temperature went down sharply after dark. During their second night on the hills some men wore the clothes of dead Jerries over their own summer uniforms.

A day and a half after the hills had been captured; Company C struggled up the cliff sides carrying rations and ammunition. The food and water supplies on the hills had been exhausted, and the goat as well as other eatables found in the German dugouts had disappeared. But the main worry had been lack of shells for the mortars. Now they would be ready when the Jerries attacked again.

It had been a job to get the supplies up the mountainside. Battalion Supply had assembled a number of Italian drivers and their mules outside Pozzilli, but as the animals were being loaded a couple of enemy shells fell among them, and all that was left was some minced mule meat and some dead civilians. After that, the men of the reserve companies had to scramble up the trails carrying the goods on their own backs.

Heavy fighting was in progress in the hills around and beyond Santa Maria Olivetto, in and north of Pozzilli, and on the slopes of Mounts Santa Croce and Corno behind Venafro. Between patrol duty and preparation for another enemy attack the men of the 100th could observe the show from their own heights, see the puffs of shells, count the seconds before the sound reached them, and watch American, and, less frequently, German, planes dropping bombs or strafing.

In the afternoon of the day after the first supplies arrived there was a heavy concentration of enemy artillery against Hills 610 and 600, and German smoke shells reduced visibility to about thirty yards. Men waited tensely for an attack, but the minutes went slowly by and no Germans
appeared. As the smoke began to lift a radio operator phoned the battalion command post on Hill 600. A party of about seventy Germans, carrying machine guns and mortars, was doubling across a small plateau about five hundred yards south of 600. For some moments there was shock in the command post.

Lieutenant Kim had stationed his platoon in a well-hidden spot in the draw between 600 and 550, occupied by soldiers of the 1st Battalion. The Jerries would have had to pass it, yet there had been no fire. What had Kim been doing-sleeping?

Suddenly rifle and BAR fire were heard. The platoon had evidently discovered the enemy, but had it done so soon enough? Gillespie ordered a section of heavy machine guns down from 600 to bolster the platoon's fire, and sent a squad to flank the enemy from the rear. He also telephoned the regimental command post to relay warning of the enemy’s approach to the 1st Battalion. That unit soon opened up on the Jerries, who were now between two fires. After milling around for a bit, they threw down their guns and marched, hands in the air, toward the 1st Battalion position. Kim later reported that he had intended to cut the Germans off from all possibility of retreat and had ordered his men to let them pass before opening fire. The 1st Battalion took thirty prisoners.

Enemy shelling continued during the rest of the day. At about 5:00 P.M. an observer from the regimental cannon company reported a German column moving down a draw from the north at a range of about eight hundred yards. Shells from the rear soon began whistling over the battalion's positions toward the German assault group. Their trajectory was low and some shorts caused casualties among the men on the hilltops, but most of the shells landed where they were supposed to. The battalion's 81-mm. mortars also lobbed shells among the Germans and, when they started to withdraw, plastered the path of their retreat. This proved to be the last enemy attack.

For the next two days each successive battalion patrol moved farther ahead before it spotted Germans. Companies A and C, acting as a provisional battalion, were patrolling the area between the 100th and the 179th Infantry in Pozzilli.

**Our KIA losses for 5 November, 1943**

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BATTLE CAMPAIGNS

Extracted from "Ambassador in Arms: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion by Thomas D. Murphy

Our KIA losses for 6 November, 1943

100 A Lt. Key, Lewis A Unknown
100 B Cpl. Enomoto, Kiyozo Aiea, HI
100 Hq Pvt. Fukagawa, Masami Honolulu, HI 100
B Pfc. Hirata, Gerome M Honolulu, HI
100 B Pvt. Kagawa, Yasuo Ewa, HI
100 E Sgt. Konoshita, Richard K Honolulu, HI 100
F Sgt. Makishi, Matsutada Makaweli, HI 100 D
Pvt. Miyata, Tamotsu Honolulu, HI
100 D Pfc. Mochizuki, Henry T Honolulu, HI 100
B Pfc. Teramoto, Lloyd M Waianae, HI

Our KIA losses for 7 November, 1943

100 B Pfc. Asai, Ralph Y Honolulu, HI
100 A Pvt. Ogata, Masaru Honolulu, HI
100 E/F Pvt. Ogata, Tsugio Waimea, HI
100 F Pvt. Ojiri, Akira Papaikou, HI

Our KIA losses for 8 November, 1943

100 D Lt. Ray, Neill M Unknown
100 D Cpl. Higashi, Bert K Honoulu, HI
100 Hq Pfc. Nakauye, Donald T Honolulu, HI
100 D Cpl. Tanouye, Katsushi Kurtistown, HI

Our KIA loss for 9 November, 1943

100 F Pvt. Kawanishi, Kikumatsu F Puueo, HI

11 November - Elements of the 179th established contact with the 135th Infantry north of Filignano and the 133rd was pinched out.

Ever since the crossing of the Volturino five nights before, the 100th’s medical section had been busy bringing in and patching up the wounded. Four aid men were killed and seven wounded when three litter squads received shellfire as they went to the rescue of some Company B casualties, and Doc Kawasaki had been hit as he climbed toward the hills. Men hit by shellfire on the ridges had to be carried all the way down to the aid station outside Pozzilli. Wounded men sometimes lay for hours on the cold ground before they were found and taken to the head of the trail. There they waited until other bearers came to carry them down. Sometimes it was as much as thirty hours before an injured man received medical attention. Shock and exposure caused as much damage as wounds, and more than one soldier died as he was being carried slowly down the steep track. Even in the comparative safety of the lower ground outside Pozzilli, shells sometimes fell around the surgeon’s tent.

The battalion came down from the heights on 11 November. Next day the first overseas pay check came through but, with the Germans still shelling the Pozzilli area, the men waited in their slit trenches until the money came around.
13 November - Enlisted men from Companies E and F were transferred to the other companies to fill the gaps made during the recent fighting, but despite these replacements A, B, C, and D still had only 150 "actives" each instead of the usual complement of 187. Since the 100th had first gone into action three officers and seventy-five enlisted men had been killed or had died of wounds, and 239 members had been wounded or injured.

15 November - VI Corps ordered a halt to the twelve-day-old attack into the hills. Faced by strong and stubbornly held positions in terrain ideally suited for defensive operations, and by almost insuperable problems in moving supplies across swollen streams and mucky roads, the 34th and 45th divisions had made scant progress since crossing the Volturno. It was raining steadily and the days were growing colder.

16 November - The 100th moved into Santa Maria Olivetto, "a nice town on a hillside," and remained there eight days. The rest was welcome, as was the opportunity to bathe and change into warm woolen underwear which had at last arrived.

Colonel Marshall inspected the battalion at Santa Maria. The new commander of the 133rd with his carefully groomed mustache with waxed spike like points which he constantly twirled, had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry in Tunisia, and liked to talk about the engagement at Fondouk in which he had won it among themselves his men called him "Von Duke." Marshall's favorite military hero was Jeb Stuart, and once the colonel got that rebel cavalryman's name into a discussion, he could be relied on to according his conversation held alone. Though his officers grinned, and the enlisted men delighted in ribald cracks about the mustache, everyone respected his qualities as commander, for he really cared about the well-being of his soldiers, and gave them tough, careful training so that as many of them as possible might emerge from battle alive-thus winning himself another title, “Hardlabor Hank.”

Memorial services for the boys who had died were held by battalion chaplain Israel Yost, a Pennsylvania-Dutch Lutheran minister who had joined the outfit at Benevento. The lanky, mild-looking, sandy-haired, bespectacled minister told how a burial detail carrying one of the 100th’s dead had met a 45th Division soldier near Pozzilli, and how he had taken off his helmet and stepped off the trail as the AJA bearers went by. Yost himself had been slightly wounded helping evacuate casualties during the river crossing, but had son been back at work in the aid station binding the wounds of his brothers-mostly Buddhist-in God.
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS

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In Hawaii, on the day memorial services were held for her son who had died on Hill 600, Yukio Asai’s mother received his last letter. Written in the simplest Japanese, it was a result of much effort. Yuki had forgotten most of what he had learned in language school and had asked his buddies to help.

Dear Mother:

Old Man Winter is here in Italy and it is 2 years since I have left you and I am dreadfully homesick for you. But I am a soldier of Uncle Sam and till I fulfill my duty I must stick on my job. I am praying to God every night that you may be well till the day of my return.

I wish you were here to see me! I have begun to see and understand the world. Looking over my school days I can imagine what a problem I must have been to you. Don't laugh, Mother, but I have learned to do my own washing. One has to be in the Army before he learns to do his laundry.

Evening is fast approaching and I must say goodbye. Please take good care of yourself till I come back…

Yukio

TO CAPTURE ROME, Fifth Army had to break through the enemy's newly completed Winter Line defenses which blocked entrance into the Liri Valley, gateway to that city.

24 November - According to the plan of attack issued on the British Xth Corps and the American II Corps would move against the Camino Hill mass and Mt. Sammucro, shoulders of the Mignano Gap, in preparation for a push through the Gap and into the valley. From the mountains at the head of the Voltorno Valley, on the Fifth’s Army's right flank, VI Corps would simultaneously drive west on the Colli-Atina and Filignano-S. Elia roads to seize high ground north and northwest of Cassino. If VI Corps and II Corps could then envelop the defenses of Cassino, German strongpoint on Highway 6 which led to Rome, an armored breakthrough might be made up the Liri Valley.

Scrub-covered hills and rocky ravines made up the area through which the 34th and 45th divisions of VI Corps would have to fight, and steep peaks on the and Filignano-S. Elia roads. The 34th Division had orders to capture the heights north and south of Cerasuolo which commanded a junction of these roads. The 133rd Regiment would advance through the hills between Cerasuolo and Castelnuovo, the 1st Battalion attacking Castelnuovo, the 3rd in the center moving against Mt. La Rocca, and the 100th on the left taking La Croce Hill north of Cerasuolo. Farther to the left, the 168th Infantry would try to capture 1600-foot Mt. Pantano, which overlooked Cerasuolo from the south. Still farther south, the 45th Division would open up a section of the Filignano-S. Elia road and assist the 168th on its right in the attack against Mt. Pantano.

25 November - Thanksgiving Day, the 133rd had moved from Scapoli to relieve the 504th Parachute Infantry in the hills about Colli at the extreme right flank of the Fifth Army line. After two weeks of steady rain the sky had cleared, and the ground was dry again. The days were not very cold, but
water sometimes froze in the canteens at night, and the men of the 100th were still wearing summer uniforms over their winter underwear. Morale received a boost when Colonel Marshall reported that General Ryder and General Lucas, VI Corps commander, were pleased with the 100th’s performance in its most recent engagement.

26 November - The two platoons of Company C which had reached Hill 920 had been ordered to establish themselves on its slopes until the rest of that company could come up from Hill 1017, but the troops on 1017 could not advance until they received more supplies from the rear. Battalion supply was short of personnel, and a detail of about twenty men had to go back from 1017 to the supply dump each night to pick up the forty-five-pound boxes of C and K rations and the five-gallon water cans which had been packed into the hills by mule train. German artillery posted on the ridges to the west made daylight movement too dangerous, and the trip to the rear area meant half a night on the steep and dangerous trails.

On the day after Thanksgiving, 1943 - The 100th received cold turkey and bread which mules had packed up the mountain trails. Part of the meat had become green on the journey, but some of the men scraped and ate it anyway, and got diarrhea.

Company C missed out on the sandwiches. On Thanksgiving Day it climbed Hill 1017, a few miles southwest of Colli. After lugging food, water, and ammunition up the 3000-foot mountain, the men encountered mortar and artillery fire at the top, but dug in without casualties. That night an officer led the 3rd and weapons platoon forward to Hill 920, on the left front, which was thought to be only lightly held by the Germans. Scrambling down the sides of 1017, skirting the sides of Hill 905, a knob on its forward slope, and then crossing a wide gulch, the advance party reached the lower eastern slopes of Hill 920 in the early morning. Scouts climbed to the top of a "pimple" on the side toward Hill 1017 and returned with news of Jerries dug in on its reverse slope. Word was sent to 1017 by field telephone that one company should be able to take the hill, and this report was relayed back to battalion headquarters near Colli.

Colonel Gillespie now planned that Company C should occupy Hill 920. Meanwhile Companies A and B would move westward on the northern slopes of Hill 841, between the crest of that ridge, which would mask their approach from enemy guns on La Croce Hill, and the Rio S. Pietro. After mopping up enemy resistance, the three companies would reunite and attack La Croce Hill, from which they could deliver flanking fire on the enemy forces defending Mount Pantano, objective of the 168th Infantry. It was a nice plan.

29 November - A column made up of Companies A and B moved to the right of Hill 1017, reached the northeast slope of Hill 841, and turned westward through the high scrub. Company B met the first resistance, from Germans in front and to the left, near the top of the ridge line. Company A was sent up the slopes to the left to flank the enemy. In the ascent it found mines through which a path had to be cleared, and near the top, German wire. Enemy rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire was heavy, and casualties mounted. It proved impossible to push the Jerries off the crest or to move west along the slopes. After several unsuccessful assaults both companies dug in.

Artillery support could not be expected; the area was evidently at extreme gun range; and the soldiers of the two companies were generally so near the enemy that shells from the rear would probably damage friend as much as foe. German shellfire knocked out three howitzers of the...
regimental Cannon Company, and disrupted the 4.2-inch chemical mortars. A and B had to depend on their own mortars, and it was impossible to find good observation posts from which to direct their fire.

For the next two weeks the companies tried unsuccessfully to push west. In the attacks and counterattacks of these days four men won Distinguished Service Crosses. During a flank attack by an A Company platoon, Private Shizuya Hayashi, a BAR man, charged at an enemy machine-gun nest through grenade and mortar fire, gun blasting from his hip, and killed nine Germans in the pit and two more as they fled. Shortly afterwards an enemy antiaircraft gun fired almost point blank at his assault party, but Hayashi, counter firing, knocked out nine more and took four prisoners.

In a defensive action Corporal Masaru Suehiro of Company A stayed at his mortar observation post, though severely wounded, and called for fire which destroyed an enemy gun nest and demoralized a strong enemy party which was forming for an assault.

A squad in the Company B sector was attacked in flank by a platoon carrying rifles, grenades, automatic pistols, and machine guns. When the fight ended, twenty-seven Germans were dead, one was wounded, and another had been lucky enough to be taken prisoner. A little later the remnant of the enemy party, about fourteen men, moved in again. This time four were killed and three wounded, and the remainder withdrew. Two men, Lt. Allan Ohata and Private Mikio Hasemoto, had done all the damage. Neither had been hurt, but Hasemoto died the next day of a mortar wound as he and Ohata fought off another attack.

Despite these and other deeds of gallantry the Germans continued to control the ridge. On the battalion's left front things had gone no better.

**Our KIA loss for 29 November, 1943**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100 A</th>
<th>Pvt. Chinen, Onso</th>
<th>Koloa, HI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pvt. Hanida, Tamotsu</td>
<td>Waiakea, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 B</td>
<td>Pvt. Hasemoto, Mikio</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pfc. Kawamoto, Yutaka</td>
<td>Mountain View, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pvt. Kawata, Albert G</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pvt. Kaya, Stephen M</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Cpl. Kuraoka, Jerry S</td>
<td>Wailuku, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Sgt. Masumura, Lawrence, K</td>
<td>Lihue, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 D</td>
<td>Cpl. Nakamura, Edward E</td>
<td>Puunene, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pfc. Oshiro, Wallace H</td>
<td>Papaikou, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pfc. Shimizu, Takeo</td>
<td>Hana, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Med Pvt. Tokuyama, Minoru</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pvt. Yamamoto, Masaru</td>
<td>Waialua, HI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30 November - When the men from Hill 1017 finally joined those on Hill 920 in the early morning they found their comrades in pretty bad state. After knocking out several machine guns on the way, at a heavy cost in men, the two platoons had managed to climb onto the “pimple,” a patch of low scrub-covered ground about twelve feet square, the highest point on the eastern slope of 920. But Germans, dug in on the pimple's reverse slope, had covered its crest with mortar fire and had forced them back down again. Behind these Jerries was a saddle, and behind this and rising from it was another knob on the western side of 920. From these point machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and Nebelwerfers fired against the eastern pimple, and lobbed shells over its crest onto the eastern slopes of 920, where the two C platoons had finally dug in, about 300 yards down, at the lower edge of a belt of dense scrub timber.

During their second night on 920 a detail from Hill 1017 had gone forward to bring them food and water. Stumbling and slipping in the dark on dew-covered roots and rocks, the heavily laden men had reached 920 with only half the water left in their three five-gallon containers-about enough for one glass of water for each soldier on the slopes. The food was to have been turkey and bread, separately packed, but the boxes had gotten mixed and only the bread reached the famished men. Thirsty, hungry, miserably cold, under intermittent mortar fire and in constant expectation of counterattack, they ate their Thanksgiving dinner.

The reinforcements who finally arrived on the 30th had been able to carry little in the way of supplies. One newcomer offered his canteen, three-quarters full, to some of the parched men. "Several accepted my water with thanks, but though any one of them could have finished it in one swig they took only a mouthful and returned the rest. Others politely refused, saying, `Keep it, you're going to need it yourself.' I thanked God I was fighting with men like these." About 10 A.M. plans were made for another attack. Two patrols went out to reconnoiter, and returned about two hours later. One had met no Germans; the other had left two of its men dead on the side of the pimple. At noon Company C broke out of the woods and started for the top. The few who reached it died there and the line wavered and receded down the hill. Reorganizing in the woods, the company made another assault, and failed again. Against machine-gun, grenade, and mortar fire, and without artillery support, the position could not be taken. The company's mortars had no observation and were firing practically blind. Retiring through the woods, the men dug in, under a rain of enemy shells which continued all that day and night. Next morning the men shook trees and shrubs, trying to catch dew from the leaves on their parched tongues, or chipped lumps of soil from the frozen ground and sucked at the moist dirt. Everyone was thirsty, hungry, cold, and generally miserable—but "I didn't hear a man complain, and we shared what little food and water we had."

The officer in charge of the original group on the hill had gone to the rear, a victim of shell shock. Company C’s commander went back to report to battalion headquarters, taking a messenger with him, and a first sergeant was left in command of the force on 920.

Company E reached the hill about 9:00 A.M. the following day. With F, the other extra company, it had at first been held in reserve near Colli. Both these units had been so depleted by transfer of personnel to other companies that each consisted of only two skeleton rifle platoons and a machine gun squad. They had at first been ordered to Hill 1017, and had started to dig in there, but then had been told to occupy Hill 905. While organizing on that position, Company E had
been ordered to leave 905 (which F would hold alone) and to move to the aid of Company C, on Hill 920. The men of E had spent the night on the trail across the gulch between 905 and 920, but were comparatively fresh, and preparations were made for another attack.

While scouting to find observation posts one artillery officer was killed and another officer and two radio men were wounded. Visibility was low, and fire directed at the German positions from the tops of neighboring hills proved of little help. It was finally decided to ask for artillery fire by map, but after several shells burst in the company area this idea was abandoned. From a nearby hill the heavy weapons company battery fired some 81-mm. mortars but without much apparent effect. At about 11:00 A.M. Company E led another attack against the hilltop, and this also failed.

By this time each unit of the combined force had suffered heavy losses. In Company C’s 3rd Platoon, for instance, a private first class led the eight men still able to fight. Battalion headquarters sent word to remain in position and await further orders. "This we were glad to do. We dug our slit trenches deeper and got ready for a counterattack and a long stay." In the afternoon it became colder, and snow fell. This soon changed to rain, which lasted until evening and was caught in raincoats, shelter halves, helmets, and anything else that would hold water. Thirst was thus temporarily relieved, but clothes and shoes were wet and the ground muddy and slit trenches filled up almost as soon as they were bailed out. Enemy mortar shells were still crunching in from the top of the hill.

Early next morning the messenger who had gone with the company commander returned. On his way back to the hill he had found a spring only about a quarter of a mile behind the outpost line, and he promised that food and water would be brought forward that night. Despite the danger of daylight travel, a detail went immediately to the spring. When night came a mule team from battalion supply dumped food- and water about a half mile from the hill. For the next nine nights parties of fifteen men went back to this supply dump for rations and ammunition.

Rain began again, shortly after the food arrived, and continued for two days and two nights. There were not enough shelter halves many of them had been used to make stretchers- but raincoats and helmets kept the men's upper parts reasonably dry. Legs and feet got soaked, however, and rather than spend the nights in their water-filled trenches men slept sitting or standing. From now on the ground was muck; trench foot became common; and at night soldiers released for treatment hobbled down the hill and across the trail to the battalion aid station three miles to the rear. To save their red, swollen, continuously aching feet they crawled over the bad places.

On the day the rain stopped, Company F arrived and its commander took control. Capable and cool, his cheerful manner lifted morale. He also brought some luck. During the rain the Jerries had continued to send over mortar fire, but now they paid less attention to the hill's forward slopes.

Though the ground remained soggy and the nights were cold and wet with heavy dew, the sun came out bright and warm. From another hill Company D’s mortars began giving the Germans some or their own medicine, and communication with battalion headquarters by radio and field telephone was better than it had been, though the communications men were still out every night splicing the wires, and the radio continued balky.
The hillside position was so near the enemy that it was necessary to speak softly, but the scrub cover acted as a screen against enemy mortar observation and made it possible to have small fires and to smoke. Soldiers who had no Coleman stoves tore their wax-covered K ration boxes into little strips, piled these carefully, and lighted them to get a smokeless fire which would heat enough water for a cup of coffee.

Evidently content where they were, the Jerries did not attack down the slopes, and there were no further assaults against the pimple. There couldn't be; despite the arrival of Companies E and F, there were less healthy men available for combat than when the two Company C platoons had first arrived at the hill.

Our KIA losses for 30 November, 1943

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<th>Age</th>
<th>City</th>
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<tr>
<td>100 B</td>
<td>Pvt. Arita, Hiroaki</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paauilo, HI</td>
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<td>100 B</td>
<td>Pvt. Fujii, Richard T</td>
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<td>Kealakekua, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pvt. Goya Yeiko</td>
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<td>Koloa, HI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pfc. Higa, Yeiko</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aiea, HI</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pvt. Ichimura, Kenichi</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pvt. Mashita, Masatomo</td>
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<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
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Our KIA losses for 1 December, 1943

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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pfc. Fujiyama, Takeo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lahaina, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 B</td>
<td>Pvt. Higa, Takemitsu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kahaluu, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pvt. Hikichi, Harry N</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pfc. Kubo, Yoshio</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 A</td>
<td>Pfc. Matsukawa, Hiroshi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hilo, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>S/Sgt. Yasui, Yoji O</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wailuku, HI</td>
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Our KIA losses for 2 December, 1943

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 E</td>
<td>Sgt. Jinnohara, Katsui</td>
<td></td>
<td>Paia, HI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Pfc. Kina, Shomatsu</td>
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Our KIA losses for 3 December, 1943

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<th>Company</th>
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<th>Age</th>
<th>City</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 B</td>
<td>Pfc. Igarashi, Shigeo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Waialua, HI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 D</td>
<td>Pvt. Otaguro, Tadashi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
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<tr>
<td>100 C</td>
<td>Sgt. Tanimoto, Teruto</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS

Excerpted from "Ambassador in Arms: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion by Thomas D. Murphy

Our KIA losses for 5 December, 1943

100 B  Pvt. Kutara, Masaji H  Honolulu, HI
100 D  Pfc. Mori, Kiyoto  Waipahu, HI
100 D  Pvt. Takahashi, Itsuo  Waipahu, HI
100 E  Pfc. Uyeda, Moriichi  Wahiawa, HI

Our KIA losses for 7 December, 1943

100 B  Pfc. Kuroda, Ichiji  Hakalau, HI
100 C  Pvt. Seshiki, Hihumi  Hanamaulu, HI

12 December - A squad of French Senegalese troops appeared. They were part of the 2nd Moroccan Division which was being sent to relieve the 34th Division. Their white lieutenant asked a few questions, stated that he intended to scout the Jerry positions, and asked for a couple of guides. Told that a daylight patrol would be suicide, he insisted on going ahead. Orders had been received that the Frenchmen were to be given "every possible cooperation," so a request was made, reluctantly, for volunteer guides. Two sergeants offered their hides for sacrifice.

Four men went out, the French lieutenant, one of his men, and the two sergeants. Five minutes later small-arms fire was heard. Soon the Frenchman and Senegalese came dashing back through the scrub. A minute or two later the firing suddenly stopped. For a time it was very quiet. No one looked at the Frenchman. Then the two sergeants emerged quietly from the woods, grim-faced but unhurt. They reported having left a dead German near the top of the hill.

Three nights later a company of French Moroccans arrived. A big moon lighting their way, they had made little noise in the approach. By 10:00 P.M. they had taken over all positions. As the remnant of C, E, and F companies quietly left Hill 920 they carried little ammunition. Most of it had been left for the French, who were using American guns; besides, the journey back would be easier without it. Company C had started out with a hundred and seventy-five men on Thanksgiving Day. About fifty of these now walked down the trail; the rest were in hospitals or were dead. Companies E and F had been inactivated, and the few men left in each had become part of C Company.

Elsewhere on the battalion front things had gone little better. In various aid stations, during the previous two weeks, Staff Sergeant Masaichi Goto, a battalion medic, had been making occasional hurried scribbles in his diary: "What a battle! ... Capt. Jack Mizuha hit. Evacuated him about 2 miles. About 50 wished this was all over.... Troops on several hill tops. My men in three aid stations. It's a job to keep tab on them.... No progress made.... We are facing mortar shells, artillery, and German planes." His last notation summed up the engagement: "Evacuated about 250 in ten days."

Beyond the aid station, three miles back, trucks were waiting to carry the men to the kitchen area. Arriving there at about 2:00 A.M., they threw shelter halves on the cold wet earth and immediately dropped to sleep.
In the morning the kitchen crew put on a real feed: ham and eggs, hot cakes, bread, mush, and coffee with cream. As the boys wrapped themselves around the kind of meal they had seen in uneasy dreams on Hill 920, they began to talk. Between great bites and gulps, even to joke and laugh about things that hadn't seemed so funny a short time ago, like the French "looie" scuttling back from his personal reconnaissance. Their stomachs stuffed with food for the first time in a months, many soon had diarrhea, but who cared?

The Moroccans had relieved Companies A and B two nights before, and during the morning there was inquiry for friends, and exchange of bad news. In the afternoon the battalion motored to the rear to join the rest of the regiment in a bivouac near Alife. There it was learned that the 1st Battalion had not been able to pass Castelnuovo, that the 3rd in the center, had reached Mt. La Rocca and had taken a hill on the south slopes of Mt. Marrone, and that the Germans were still on Mt. Pantano, where they had been giving the 168th Infantry a rough time. Much farther south, Fifth Army troops were still trying to capture Mounts Lungo and Sammucro.

A “white Christmas” reminded the boys that, though it might seem longer, it had been only a year since they had taken photographs of snowmen at McCoy, They cut an evergreen on a nearby hill, placed it in an open area of the camp, and decorated it with pieces of tin from C ration cans and red berries from native shrubs. Chaplain Yost held a "solemn and beautiful service" before the tree and afterwards there was singing of carols.

At the end of December, as most of the VI Corps left the front to prepare for an amphibious assault behind the Winter Line, the French Expeditionary Force took over its sector, and the 34th Division was transferred to II Corps control. The Red Bulls moved up to relieve the 36th Division, and the 133rd marched to an assembly area during a New Year's Eve blizzard. At Presenzano, where the regiment rested for five days, three staff sergeants of the 100th received commissions as second lieutenants.

The Germans had finally been pushed off Mounts Lungo and Sammucro. The Fifth Army prepared for the next phase of the Winter Line campaign, in which II Corps would move up into the Liri Valley, and the French would push west into the high ground north of Cassino. On the left of the II Corps sector, Task Force "A" (the 6th Armored Infantry reinforced by the 1st Armored Division) would capture Mt. Porchia, and the 135th Infantry of the 34th Division would take S. Vittore and Mt. la Chiaia. The 168th on the right of the 135th, would push into the hills north of S. Vittore, break the enemy line anchored on the mountains, and outflank la Chiaia to the northeast. On the right of the 168th the 1st Special Service Force, reinforced, would attack high in the mountains northeast of la Chiaia and Cervaro, and would then move west, flanking Cervaro from the north. After la Chiaia was taken, the 168th and 135th would converge on Cervaro. If these attacks were successful the Germans on Mt. Trocchio, last obstacle to American advance out of the Mignano Gap, would find their northern flank uncovered, and would face an all-out assault from northeast, south, and southwest.

**5 January** - The day scheduled for the beginning of these attacks, the 1st Battalion of the 133rd was detached to act as reserve for Task Force "A," and moved from Presenzano to Mt. Lungo. The next day the rest of the regiment trucked to Ceppagna and then marched to an assembly area nearby. Here it came under command of the 1st Special Service Force, which, with the artillery of the 36th Division added, now formed Task Force "B."
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS

Excerpted from "Ambassador in Arms: The Story of Hawaii's 100th Battalion by Thomas D. Murphy

6 January - Its third regiment captured the peak of Mt. Majo (Hill 1259) on the night of and for the next three days fought off desperate German attempts to recapture that height.

7 January - The SSF's first regiment attacked toward Vischiatoro Ridge (Hill 1109), west of Mt. Majo and directly overlooking Cervaro.

The 100th and 3rd Battalions of the 133rd had followed the third regiment of the SSF onto Mt. Majo. On the night of 7 January the 100th moved forward to take Hill 1190, a spur to the west, but lost its way in the foggy darkness, and after a three-hour march was called back to the line of departure. The next night the battalion moved forward again, and against only minor resistance climbed and took the high knobby plateau which was Hill 1190. The next two days patrols were sent to the northwest, toward Hill 1270. During this period news arrived that four staff sergeants had received commissions as second lieutenants.

Snow and mud had hindered the men in climbing the hill's lower slopes, and the final assault had been made above the timberline, across barren windswept rounded rock covered only by scattered patches of snow. In their solidly built dugouts, with plenty of food and ammunitions, the Germans had evidently been prepared for a long stay. That night Major Clough told the officers of his new command that the day's action had been the best job of two-battalion coordination against a strongly emplaced enemy that he had yet seen. The enemy made no counterattacks, and both battalions rested the next day. The weather was the worse obstacles than the in fight for Hills 841 and 920.

7 January - The 135th Infantry had taken S. Vittore and Mt. La Chiaia.

Our KIA loss for 9 January, 1944

100 B  Pfc. Kawamoto, Toshio Honolulu, HI
100 B  Pfc. Masunage, Kiyoshi Hookena, HI
100 B  Sgt. Takeba, Masaharu Honolulu, HI

Our KIA loss for 10 January, 1944

100 B  2nd Lt. Switzer, Edward H Unknown
100 Med Tech 5 Hayashida, Hideyuki Pauwela, HI
100 Med Tech 5 Ikeda, Isamu Ninole, HI
100 B  Pfc. Ito, Hachiyo Honolulu, HI
100 Med Pfc. Katsuda, Masaichi C Makaweli, HI
100 D  Sgt. Nakamura, Yoshimitsu Hanalei, HI
100 B  Pvt. Nezu, Yutaka Waimanalo, HI

11 January - At about 6:00 A.M. the battalion moved through the fog-covered saddle between 1190 and 1270. When the haze lifted at about 10:00 A.M., the Jerries laid down heavy mortar fire and stopped Company A, the lead unit. Companies B and C swung to the right to ease the pressure, but came under mortar and small-arms fire from a flanking ridge and were unable to advance. By nightfall there had been numerous casualties, and Company C's commander had been wounded.
BATTLE CAMPAIGNS

Extracted from "Ambassador in Arms: The Story of Hawaii’s 100th Battalion by Thomas D. Murphy

In this action Sergeant Masaharu Takeba, whose platoon was pinned down by machine-gun fire, moved away from his men and deliberately exposed himself in order to draw the enemy fire. He died, and his family later received a Bronze Star. At dawn the 3rd Battalion of the 133rd was sent against the ridge on the right, and Companies A, B, and C moved frontally against Hill 1270. Fire from the 81-mm. mortars gave strong support, and by evening the battalion was mopping up the last enemy resistance on the reverse slopes of the objective.

Our KIA losses for 12 January, 1944

100 A Pvt. Ashikawa, Shigeo Honolulu, HI
100 C Sgt. Irie, Masaji Ewa, HI

13 January - After having captured Cervaro two days before, the 168th Infantry was on the slopes overlooking Le Pastinelle and the Rapido River Plan, and only a mile from Mt. Troccio, from which the Germans now withdrew without a fight.

Our KIA loss for 14 January, 1944

100 Med T/Sgt. Shiramizu, Kiyoshi J Salinas, CA

16 January - The French on the north flank of the Fifth Army were in S. Elia. The Winter Line had been broken, but now the Allies faced the more formidable Gustav Line, built by Hitler's famous Todt organization. This barrier began in the hills above S. Elia, ran along the Rapido, crossed the mountains behind Cassino, followed the Rapido and Gari rivers through the Valley, and then extended through the mountains north of the Garigliano to the sea. Its immensely strong fortifications had to be cracked before there could be a breakthrough up the Liri Valley toward Rome, some ninety miles away.

Please note that the 100th Infantry Battalion was an oversized battalion until it merged with the 442nd Regimental Combat team.

Compiled by Americans of Japanese Ancestry World War II Memorial Alliance in partnership with Japanese American Living Legacy
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